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aS unit cell surface area 
Pc  constant pressure specific heat 
ρ  density 
H
D  channel hydraulic diameter 
ε  surface roughness 
e fluid total energy per unit mass 
f friction factor 
g gravitational acceleration 
h heat transfer coefficient 
i fluid internal energy per unit mass 
k thermal conductivity, or core eigenvalue (multiplication factor) 
l unit cell conduction length  
L channel length 
m  mass flow rate 
Nu Nussult number  
P pressure 
Pr Prandtl number 
q  heat flux 
gen
q′′′  volumetric energy generation rate 
Q  heat transfer rate 
R universal gas constant 
Re Reynolds number 










Sub-scripts and Super-scripts 
(0) iteration 0 
(1) iteration 1 
(2) iteration 2 
ave average 
conv convection 
e  outlet 
ent,hy hydrodynamic entrance length 
gen generation 
i  inlet, or mass centered fluid control volume number 
j  momentum centered fluid control volume number  
n  channel number 
N  number of channels 








A new transient thermal hydraulic method for simulating prismatic HTGRs during 
a loss-of-forced-circulation (LOFC) accident is presented. This expands upon the steady 
state thermal hydraulic methodology presented in the Author’s MS Thesis. However, 
several key additions have been made. The largest is the addition of a transient analysis 
method that computes the fluid mass, velocity (momentum), and energy throughout a 
transient. This is achieved by using a well-documented, semi-implicit pressure-correction 
scheme. The fluid volumes are assumed to be 1-D to allow for the use of standard heat 
transfer and pressure drop correlations. Simple transient velocity and pressure boundary 
conditions are employed. Helium is assumed to be an ideal gas with constant specific heats, 
which allows for the use of simple thermodynamic relationships to close the fluid model. 
Models for reactor containment cooling (RCCS) heat transfer and decay heat generation 
have also been added. 
Using the method developed here, both the pressurized (P-LOFC) and de-
pressurized (D-LOFC) accident have been simulated. Results from these analyses confirm 
the HTGR’s key safety advantage over all LWRs and most other advanced reactor designs, 
which is to have passive, indefinite cooling capability for the most limiting accident. 
A RELAP model has also been developed and tested for the HTGR. This is done 
to highlight the limitations of existing methods for the simulation of the prismatic fuel and 
to emphasize the need and novelty of the method developed here. The newly developed 
method provides two significant advantages over available thermal hydraulic analysis 
techniques. The first is its ability to compute whole-core results and capture the important 
transient core-level phenomena such as bypass flow, and heat redistribution into the 
reflector assemblies after reactor SCRAM. The second is its ability to compute each fuel 




graphite, and coolant channel. These two factors combine to produce realistic, 3-D transient 
results for prismatic HTGRs during a LOFC. 





A new class of gas cooled reactors is being investigated for its many advantages 
over existing Generation II-III and Generation III+ (e.g., Westinghouse AP1000, G.E. 
ESBWR, Areva EPR) reactors. These high temperature gas cooled reactors (HTGRs) are 
being designed to have core outlet temperatures in excess of 850oC. This is only now 
possible due to advancements in TRI-Isotropic (TRISO) coated fuels, which can sustain 
very high temperatures without cladding failure. Being able to produce a large, reliable, 
carbon emission free supply of high grade thermal energy opens new avenues for coupled 
process heat applications (e.g., hydrogen production).  
In addition to the potential coupled process heat economic advantages, HTGRs also 
have substantial safety benefits over more traditional light water reactor and other 
advanced reactor designs. The passive safety features employed by HTGRs allow for 
indefinite heat removal for most accident scenarios including the type that crippled the 
Fukushima Daiichi plant in Japan. 
The central component to the passive safety operation of HTGRs is the Reactor 
Containment Cooling System (RCCS). It is either an air-cooled or water-cooled system 
that operates without the use of pumps or electricity. Its purpose is to cool the containment 
walls, which in turn cool the reactor vessel wall through thermal radiation and conduction 
within the containment gas space. Cooling of the vessel wall subsequently cools the helium 
inside in the vessel. This action establishes a natural circulation loop from the core to the 
vessel wall.  
The design and analysis of the RCCS has been well documented in recently 
published work, see Vaghetto and Hassan (2014). However, the core and vessel thermal 
hydraulics have not been analyzed in sufficient detail to certify the passive safety operation 
for the HTGR. The principal goal of this work is to develop a high fidelity method for 




passive safety performance. The rest of this chapter is devoted to describing the geometry 
of the HTGR in more detail, as well as describing the accident scenarios of interest, and 
the scope of the current research. More information about the HTGR’s historical 
background and the differences between specific HTGR designs can be found in Huning 
(2014). 
1.1   High Temperature Gas Reactor (HTGR) Design Summary 
 HTGR development began in the mid-1960s with the operation of several prototype 
and commercial reactors in the US and UK. The developmental history of these early 
designs including the most recent commercial US HTGR, Fort St. Vrain Generating Station 
in Platteville, CO, can be found in a paper by August and Hunter (2008). Helium was 
selected as the coolant for its inert radioactive and chemical properties, and favorable high 
temperature thermal properties. Graphite was selected as the moderator due to its neutron 
moderating properties and resilience at high temperatures. Fuels were designed with both 
low enriched uranium and thorium options for breeding in advanced fuel cycles. Efficient 
usage and high burn rates of the fuel allows for less spent fuel or waste to be produced than 
in current reactors.   
Current prismatic HTGR designs include the General Atomics GT-MHR, Areva 
ANTARES, and other conceptual designs by the US Department of Energy (DOE) and 
Korean Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI). The Modular High Temperature Gas 
Reactor (MHTGR-350), see Williams et al. (1989), proposed by the DOE, and designed 
with help from a number of different companies, including General Atomics, was selected 
as the reference design for the work presented here. The prismatic HTGR core layout is 
similar across all of the conceptual designs. A cross-sectional view of the MHTGR core is 
shown in Figure 1.1.  
The MHTGR is smaller than designs being investigated today and is rated for 350 




compacts and coolant channels of similar diameters at a ratio of two to one, respectively. 
The core is stacked 10 blocks high for a total height of eight meters. Coolant flows 
downward through the core. At initial fuel loading, control rods are axially withdrawn 
upward and power/temperature peaks in the lower half of the core.  
 
While the core arrangement and thermal-fluid parameters may differ between 
specific HTGR designs, the assembly and fuel designs are similar. The inner and outer 
reflector block regions are solid graphite. The active fuel region consists of regular fuel 
and control rod fuel assemblies. The regular fuel assemblies contain 108 circular coolant 
channels, 210 cylindrical fuel pins containing TRISO particles imbedded in a graphite 
matrix, and locations for six burnable poison pins. Prismatic HTGR fuel and control rod 
assemblies are identical in geometry and dimensions across most designs (GT-MHR, 
Areva, MHTGR).  The regular fuel and control rod fuel assembly geometries are shown in 









The MHTGR is rated at 350 MWth while most other HTGR designs are rated 
between 500 MWth and 600 MWth. This is compensated for by having a smaller core, fewer 
assemblies, and a slightly lower power density. The remaining thermal-fluid design 
parameters are listed below in Table 1.1, see Williams et al. (1989). 
 
Table 1.1 MHTGR Thermal Design Parameters, see Williams et al. (1989) 
Parameter MHTGR 
Core Thermal Power 350 MW 
Power Density 5.9 MW/m3 
Operating Pressure 6.4 MPa 
Inlet Temperature 260 °C 
Outlet Temperature 690 °C 
Core Flow Rate 157.1 kg/s 
 
 HTGRs are expected to have several active normal operation and safety systems 
designed to shut down the reactor. During normal operation, control rods are inserted and 
hot helium gas is cooled by a connected intermediate heat exchanger such as a steam 
generator, as is the case for the AREVA HTGR design. If this is not available or not 
properly functioning, it is expected that there will be a low pressure water-cooled heat 
exchanger connected at the base of the vessel. For the MHTGR, this is called the Shutdown 
 
Figure 1.2 Regular Fuel (Left) and Control Fuel (Right) Assemblies, Adapted 





Cooling System (SCS). If this does not operate, for example, if there is no electricity to 
drive the pumps for the water, then heat removal is expected to occur by the Reactor 
Containment Cooling System (RCCS). A diagram of a generalized HTGR reactor vessel is 
shown in Figure 1.3. 
 
 The RCCS can either be air- or water- cooled. For either case, no pumps or 
circulators are required. The system is highly reliable since there are no moving parts and 
it is always open to the environment. The RCCS operates by cooling the containment walls 
which cools the vessel by heat conduction and radiation. For the core to successfully cool 
down, helium natural circulation within the vessel must be established to convectively cool 
the graphite fuel blocks. Depending on the specific accident, this recirculation may or may 
 





not occur, which could lead to fuel failure. The design safety basis case for HTGRs is the 
Loss-of-Forced-Circulation (LOFC) accident.  
1.2   Loss-of-Forced-Circulation (LOFC) Accidents 
 Early safety evaluation documents by Williams et al. (1989) and General Atomics 
(1996) set the foundation for prismatic HTGR safety analysis. In these reports, a set of 
bounding design basis events (DBEs) evaluated the use of low order plant dynamics 
models. For example, the fluid transport models typically ignore fluid inertia and unique 
core flow paths such as bypass channels. 
In the case of the MHTGR, DBEs include loss of heat transport and shutdown 
cooling systems (DBE-1), moisture ingress (DBE-6), primary coolant leak (DBE-10), 
primary coolant leak without heat transport and shutdown cooling systems (DBE-11), and 
others. DBE-1 is particularly important today because this reflects an extended station 
blackout (SBO) scenario in which no electrical power is available. DBE-1 is commonly 
known today as a pressurized loss-of-forced-convection (P-LOFC) scenario. DBE-11 is 
commonly known today as a depressurized loss-of-forced-convection (D-LOFC) scenario. 
For both cases, a reactor trip is assumed to occur at the start of the accident and thus core 
power decreases according to the decay heat curve. For all cases, the reactor cavity cooling 
system (RCCS) is assumed to operate. Figure 1.4 shows the helium flow path within the 





 The accident progression for these accidents is typically as follows: 
• Loss of all onsite and offsite electrical power (Station Blackout) 
• Control rods insert due to power failure 
• Helium circulators stop and flow ceases  
• Fuel temperatures initially decreases as core power rapidly decreases 
• Graphite and fuel temperatures slowly increase over time as helium flow is 
reduced 
• As core helium temperature begins to increase: 
 Helium natural circulation flow increases 
 Vessel wall temperature begins to rise 
 RCCS heat removal to the environment increases 
• After some time (around 24-48 hours, also referred to as, teq), RCCS heat 
removal rate outstrips the core heat generation rate 
• Core temperatures begins to decrease to a stable condition 
The key question for these accidents is, “Does the peak fuel temperature over the 
length of accident exceed the fuel failure temperature?” For the D-LOFC accident, the 
pressure is reduced to approximately 1 MPa, compared to the P-LOFC case that remains 
 
 





near the nominal 6.4 MPa. This leads to a reduction in helium density for the D-LOFC 
case. Therefore, a larger temperature difference between the core and the vessel wall is 
needed to drive natural circulation at an adequate mass flow rate for the D-LOFC case. In 
the MHTGR safety evaluation document by Williams et al. (1989), the PANTHER code 
was used to simulate the D-LOFC accident. Figure 1.5 contains a plot of the heat 
generation, RCCS heat removal, and vessel temperature over the D-LOFC accident. 
  
For TRI-ISOtropic (TRISO-coated) fuels, the expected fuel failure temperature is 
1600oC based on early TRISO fuel safety and performance data, Williams et al. (1989). In 
Figure 5, at approximately 70 hours from the initiation of the accident sequence, the heat 
generation matches the heat removed by the RCCS. At this time, the peak fuel temperature 
is just below 1600oC. However, many assumptions and approximations are made in the 
simulation with the PANTHER code, which may lead to higher predicted fuel 
temperatures. Since there is very little predicted safety margin for the D-LOFC accident 
with low-order calculations, higher fidelity calculations are needed to ensure that safety 
margins are still met. Some of the most critical assumptions associated with coarse or low-
order thermal hydraulic tools include:  
 





• Single (sub-channel) approach 
• Graphite/fuel/helium homogenized thermal unit cells  
• Bypass flow neglected 
The difficulty in using available transient simulation tools is that the HTGR 
assembly geometry is not well modeled. This leads to incorrect estimates for heat 
conduction within the graphite and ultimately incorrect peak fuel temperature estimations. 
More detailed core modeling and LOFC analyses are needed to help certify the HTGR’s 
passive safety features for the design safety basis cases.  
1.3   Scope of Present Research 
 In the present investigation, a transient-fluid thermal hydraulic method capable of 
predicting the whole-core, 3-D, temperature, pressure and mass flow distribution is 
developed. This investigation primarily focuses on the active core region, but also includes 
simple models for the other vessel volumes. RCCS heat removal is approximated as a 
simple linear function versus vessel wall temperature. Although radiation heat transfer 
from a grey or black body is a fourth-order function of temperature, as the vessel wall 
temperature increases, the RCCS or containment wall temperature also increases, leading 
to a nearly linear increase in total heat removal as vessel wall temperature increases. 
Additionally, there are conduction and convective heat transfer effects within containment. 
Because of the modeling complexities associated with RCCS heat removal and 
containment geometry uncertainty, a simple model for heat removal vs. vessel wall 
temperature based on predetermined RCCS performance is used. The predetermined RCCS 
performance is based on the MHTGR air-cooled RCCS design as described in Williams et 
al. (1989).  
Decay heat generation is approximated using standard ANSI decay heat curves for 




low-enriched UO2. The neutron energy spectrum is also expected to be thermal thus this 
assumption is deemed valid.  
The initial temperature and power profile is supplied by a steady sate coupled 
calculation documented in Connolly et al. (2016). The method is then applied to the 
MHTGR and both Pressurized and Depressurized LOFC accidents are investigated. The 
results from these simulations are then compared with the predictions of a RELAP5-3D 
model of the MHTGR as well as with results published in the literature.  
 The method presented here expands on the steady state method described in detail 
in Huning et al. (2016), which has been successfully used for a number of different HTGR 
designs and cases. The MHTGR geometry, LOFC boundary and initial conditions used for 
the present work are taken from the MHTGR safety evaluation report by Williams et al. 
(1989).   
 The method presented here will be able to predict whole-core temperature profiles 
that capture the temperature gradients within each assembly block and fuel compact. The 
coupled semi-implicit fluid solver is able to predict the helium density, mass flow rate, and 
heat removal from each individual coolant channel. The thermal hydraulic models offer 
unique advantages over other available tools. It is currently not feasible to perform whole-
core CFD analyses for the LOFC accidents. In contrast, the method developed here can 
perform whole-core transient calculations with much greater detail than systems level 
codes such as RELAP. This is demonstrated in a subsequent chapter in the dissertation 
when the LOFC results are compared against a RELAP5 model of the MHTGR and the 
prismatic fuel.  
1.4   Organization of Dissertation 
 The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows: 
• Chapter 2 presents an overview of the available literature on HTGR safety and 




• Chapter 3 presents the physical modeling aspects of the method, such as the core 
thermal unit cells and transient fluid procedure. 
• Chapter 4 describes the numerical scheme, implementation, and use of auxiliary 
calculations to obtain the needed boundary and initial conditions  
• Chapter 5 presents a summary of the P-LOFC and D-LOFC results using the 
developed method. 
• Chapter 6 describes the development of the RELAP model of the HTGR and 
comparisons with the predictions of the method developed here. 
• Chapter 7 presents conclusions based on the transient results and suggests areas of 




2.   LITERATURE REVIEW 
 Over the years, research on HTGR thermal hydraulics has been conducted by many 
different domestic and international organizations. Today, HTGRs have received renewed 
interest due to their ability to provide a clean source of high temperature heat for industrial 
process applications, in addition to electrical power generation. The need for high 
efficiency process heat inspired the selection of AVERA’s prismatic HTGR design to be 
the ideal candidate for the Next Generation Nuclear Plant (NGNP) by the NGNP Industry 
Alliance in 2012. Since then, companies such as AREVA, General Atomics, and others 
have been exploring potential licensing paths for the HTGR. One major step for licensing 
is the demonstration of successful passive safety operation of HTGRs for the design safety 
basis cases. For HTGRs, these are the P-LOFC and D-LOFC cases.  
 Other accident scenarios important to the safety and licensing of the HTGR include 
air and water/moisture ingress. While peak fuel temperature is still a major concern, 
material and structural issues involving graphite oxidation are equally as important for 
these scenarios. However, most analyses show that even for extreme cases, absent of core 
structural concerns, peak fuel temperature is no worse than for the LOFC accidents.    
 Several different thermal hydraulic analysis tools exist to compute the core transient 
information to demonstrate LOFC safety margin. These principally fall into three different 
categories: (a) CFD, (b) system level, and (c) unit cell or intermediate level. CFD 
techniques are well equipped to compute the detailed assembly temperature profiles but 
are unable to perform whole-core calculations due to computational costs. System-level 
codes such as RELAP are well equipped to compute core-level temperature profiles but are 
usually restricted to just a few fuel pins or assemblies. It is also difficult to approximate 
the assembly geometry correctly using simple equivalent cylinder or slab models. Unit cell 




the highest potential since whole-core calculations are possible with computed pin or near-
pin-level temperature gradients for the hexagonal fuel assembly geometry.    
 The lower and upper plenum volumes within the vessel are also important for both 
steady state and transient safety. Analyzing coolant flow entry and mixing into the lower 
plenum is important for identifying hot spots and investigating any material or mechanical 
concerns due to excessive heating. The upper plenum is primarily important for accident 
situations without forced circulation. Mixing and formation of turbulent eddies act to 
inhibit natural circulation through the vessel. 
 This chapter discusses in detail the current research on RCCS performance as well 
as for LOFC accidents, upper and lower plenum phenomena, and the available core thermal 
hydraulic tools to estimate LOFC transient behavior.  
2.1 HTGR Thermal Hydraulic Analysis Codes 
 For Light Water Reactors (LWRs), the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
(NRC) does not mandate a specific thermal hydraulic safety analysis code or package of 
codes but instead offers regulatory guidance on standard expectations of analysis tools. 
Popular thermal hydraulic and severe accident codes for LWRs in the nuclear industry 
include:  
• RELAP5/SCDAP, Idaho National Laboratory (2005), 
• MAAP, Electric Power Research Institute (2010), 
• MELCOR, Gauntt et al. (2000), and 
• TRACE, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (2001).  
Due to the significantly different flow and core geometry for gas reactors, these 
LWR codes may not be suitable for the analysis of HTGRs. One option could be to couple 
CFD core heat transfer calculations to systems level calculations by RELAP. Another 
option for modeling secondary side transient analysis is to use MELCOR-H2, which is 




In addition to these options, the GAMMA+ code, Kim et al. (2010), is a new code 
developed specifically to analyze air ingress events and hydrogen plant transients.  The 
GAMMA+ code solves the conservation equations for a mixture of many gas species and 
solid nodes. It also contains a turbomachinery model for integrated plant response.         
The methodology for calculating core temperatures during transients is 
significantly different than for calculating steady state temperatures. The main difference 
between modeling the two operating modes is spatial resolution. Larger, more 
encapsulating, computational unit-cells must be used to increase the speed of the transient 
calculations since VHTR transients can typically progress for hundreds or thousands of 
hours. Transient modeling also typically requires thermal hydraulic feedback or inputs 
from various other models such as neutronics or structural calculations.   
2.1.1 CFD Analyses 
CFD codes such as: 
• Trio_U, Bieder and Graffard (2008),  
• FLUENT, FLUENT (2005), 
• Fuego, Sandia National Laboratories (2008), 
• CFX 11, ANSYS Inc. (2006), and 
• STAR-CCM+, CD-adapco (2008), 
have been used to determine steady state temperature profiles for a number of HTGR cases. 





 A few consistent conclusions can be drawn from the various CFD studies of the 
core and lower plenum flows. The first is that boundary conditions and core power profiles 
are important. In a study by Anderson et al. (2008), coupling to RELAP5 proved important 
for matching boundary conditions in the lower plenum. Without whole-core modeling, 
computed individual mass flow distributions for partial assembly cases were based on 
average core assembly flow rates instead of their exact values. This leads to under predicted 
fuel temperatures for the particular assemblies that had lower flow rates than the average. 
Power profiles for all core assembly and bypass cases were assumed to be uniform or flat 
axially. This also leads to lower computed assembly temperatures.  
The second conclusion is that there is still disagreement on which turbulence 
models and CFD methods are more suitable for HTGRs. Most studies, like Sato et al. 
(2010) or Tak et al. (2008), used the realizable k-ε model. However, this was estimated by 
Johnson (2008) to not predict unsteady vortex shedding correctly and he recommended that 
Table 2.1 Steady State CFD Analyses 
Study Code Note 




Coupled RELAP core model, 
CFD lower plenum flow 
Cioni et al. (2006) Trio_U,  
Bieder and Graffard (2008) 
Partial coolant channel blocking 
Johnson (2008) FLUENT, FLUENT (2005) RANS vs URANS comparison 




FLUENT Lower plenum flow for a 
simplified experimental model 
Rodriguez and 
El-Genk (2010) 
FUEGO, Sandia National 
Laboratories (2008) 
Analysis of lower plenum helical 
coil inserts 
Sato et al. (2010) FLUENT 0, 3, and 5 mm bypass gap width 
Tak et al. (2008) CFX 11, 
ANSYS Inc. (2006) 
1 and 5 mm bypass gap width 






the Reynolds stress model (RSM) should be used for HTGR assembly problems. CFD 
modeling differences, as described in Johnson (2008), have been found to yield differences 
in peak fuel temperature by as much as 100oC.  
Finally, for all lower plenum and core cases, the minimum number of 
computational cells for a single assembly was found to be between 500,000 for a 2-D 
calculation and 2 million cells for a 3-D calculation. Most of the reported calculation times 
for the CFD cases listed in Table 2.1 were between 50 hours to a week. Extrapolating to a 
whole-core calculation (e.g., the MHTGR), the mesh would need at least 85 million cells 
(169 × 500,000) not including cells for the connected vessel volumes such as the plenums 
and riser channels. This computational analysis method is not practical for commercial 
reactor safety analysis.  
2.1.2 Unit Cell and Non-CFD Core Thermal Hydraulic Analyses 
Unit-cell methods typically include 2D or 3D core heat transfer geometry models 
and simplified iterative thermal hydraulic schemes. This method allows for larger fractions 
of the core to be modeled with less computational effort than similar CFD models. Because 
of the added fuel assembly complexity, new methods beyond standard LWR sub-channel 
approaches (e.g., COBRA-TF, Salko and Avramova (2015)) are needed for prismatic gas 
cooled reactor design and analysis. 
Since the initial introduction of the HTGR and VHTR designs based on the 
MHTGR and GT-MHR cores respectively, a thermal hydraulic and neutronic analysis 
study was performed by MacDonald (2003) at INL and General Atomics. The NGNP point 
design considers both the pebble bed and prismatic type VHTR designs. The goal of the 
analysis was to perform parametric sensitivity studies to establish an analytical starting 
point for future evaluations by quantifying the impact of variations to key design 
parameters such as core power, power density, assembly geometry, fuel configuration and 
others. The parametric studies investigated the impact of bypass flow, flow distribution, 




and D-LOFC accidents. The results of the simulated LOFC accidents are discussed in the 
next section.  
The core heat transfer methodology of the point design study involves using a 
number of triangular unit-cells to approximate one third of the core. Each unit-cell contains 
graphite, one sixth of a coolant channel, and one third of a fuel pin. Core power density is 
determined using Monte Carlo (MCNP) reactor physics calculations from the initial 
neutronics point design studies as part of the NGNP report. The power profile used for the 
thermal hydraulic calculations resembles a chopped cosine that is peaked in the lower half 
of the core. This shape is due to the insertion of control rods from the top to the critical mid 
plane of the core. Values for total coolant flow, inlet pressure and temperature are assumed. 
The fraction of flow that bypasses the coolant channels and the fraction of heat removed 
by the bypass flow are also assumed. One important assumption was neglecting cross flow 
between coolant channels. Cross flow could occur do to small cracks within the graphite 
assembly and the pressure difference between channels at given axial locations. Once the 
problem was bounded, calculations were performed to estimate the impact of critical 
parameters. The main recommendations of the thermal hydraulic point design studies were: 
• Continue to perform nuclear design and core configuration studies such that 
power peaking could be reduced.  
• Use a finer resolution and local power densities for the thermal hydraulic 
calculations to capture 3D effects. 
• Develop a more detailed flow network that explicitly determines bypass and 
cross flow. Using the detailed model, determine core locations for fixed orifices 
that minimize transverse pressure gradients. Also use the detailed model to 
analyze mechanical solutions that minimize total bypass flow and 
correspondingly, maximum fuel temperatures. 
• Additional recommendations, but not investigated in the parametric studies 




thermal resistance, reducing the gap space between the compact and graphite 
block, and reducing the diameter of the compacts while increasing the number 
of compacts per assembly. Another recommendation not investigated would be 
to possibly increase the surface roughness of the coolant channels by balancing 
the additional heat transfer benefit against the allowable pressure drop. 
 Since the NGNP point design, there have been some neutronic and thermal 
hydraulic studies that are more detailed and offer as many design insights as the initial 
point design report. One such similar design study was performed by F. Damian (2008) in 
support of the European Union RAPHAEL project. The VHTR core characteristics 
presented are most similar to the GT-MHR with inlet and outlet temperatures of 490 and 
850°C, respectively. Thermal hydraulic and neutronic trade-off studies were performed 
using the 3-D thermal hydraulic code CAST3M, Studer et al. (2003), and neutronics 
calculation scheme NEPHTIS, Cavalier et al. (2006). The thermal calculations were 
performed in detail for a “hot spot” assembly. Several fuel and assembly geometry 
configuration changes were tested in an attempt to reduce maximum fuel temperature. The 
results indicate that minor improvements are possible but the results would not likely 
warrant the modifications. Reducing the radial peaking factor was the most successful 
method to reduce the maximum fuel temperature. To reduce radial peaking, several fuel 
burn-up, fuel loading, and enrichment options were analyzed. The fuel element 
management scheme using fresh fuel in the middle active core ring, second cycle fuel in 
the outer ring, and third cycle fuel in the inner ring provided the largest reasonable 
reduction in peaking factor. 
2.2 LOFC Analyses 
Conduction cool-down or LOFC cases were among the first scenarios analyzed for 
early HTGR designs. During a P-LOFC scenario, a reactor trip is assumed to occur at the 




followed immediately by a reactor trip at the start of the accident. However, this does not 
necessarily have to occur as the core will begin shutting down upon fuel heat-up. In that 
case, recriticality would be a concern but not until core temperatures fall back below their 
initial values. This could be hundreds of hours after the accident initiation, at which point 
operators could use standard reactivity control mechanisms.  
 Under normal circumstances (i.e., electrical systems operational and no station 
black-out), the power conversion system (PCS) will continue to operate and remove decay 
heat with the shutdown cooling system (SCS) in standby. For the direct Brayton cycle, the 
PCU/PCS consists of a turbine/compressor/generator unit, recuperator, precooler, and an 
intercooler. Heat is rejected through the water cooled precooler and intercooler. For an 
indirect Rankine cycle, the power conversion unit consists of a steam generator and 
associated feedwater components. In some designs, the power conversion unit contains a 
helium cooled intermediate heat exchanger for an additional protective loop separate from 
the reactor. If the PCS is not available, then the SCS will cause closure of the main loop 
shutoff valve. The SCS consists of a circulator, heat exchanger, and shutdown loop shutoff 
valve. The SCS heat exchanger is water cooled by a single loop that serves all plant 
modules requiring cooling. The peak cooling capacity of the SCS is typically 10 times that 
of long term decay heat levels of only a few MW. When the power conversion and 
shutdown cooling systems fail to remove decay heat from the coolant, the reactor cavity 
cooling system (RCCS) will passively remove heat from the vessel by thermal radiation 
and natural convection as temperatures rise. The RCCS, first implemented by the MHTGR, 
is designed to prevent core damage for both the P-LOFC and D-LOFC cases.  
 The NGNP point design analysis, see MacDonald (2003), indicates that maximum 
fuel and vessel temperatures for both pressurized and depressurized cases are sensitive to 
the decay heat rate, effective graphite conductivity, vessel emissivity, and insulation value 
for the upper plenum among the other normal reactor design values. Several studies have 




LOFC accident scenarios. The P-LOFC is less challenging than the D-LOFC case due to 
the coolant remaining at high pressure. The higher pressure is beneficial for core heat 
transfer and natural circulation. Therefore, it is more important from a safety perspective 
to investigate core and vessel integrity over the life of a D-LOFC accident. Williams et al. 
(1989) suggests that P-LOFC accidents should be considered simply as a single variation 
of the D-LOFC. While the studies vary in the choice of reactor design, power level, core 
dimensions, and choice of analysis tool, some similar trends are observed and are discussed 
here. Three different D-LOFC studies are reviewed here. 
 The first is the study of MTHGR cases presented in Williams et al. (1989), which 
uses an ORNL code called “MORECA”, Ball (1991), as the LOFC analysis tool. The 
MHTGR as presented in the Safety Evaluation document has a core thermal power of 350 
MW and initially has an average fuel temperature 690oC.  The accident is initiated with a 
hot-duct pipe break into containment followed by insertion of control rods. The second 
case is the Japanese conceptual GTHTR-300 presented in Sato et al. (2013). This reactor 
design has a core thermal power of 600 MW and the fuel is initially 850oC. This D-LOFC 
analysis was performed using the RELAP5-3D code with the enabled Point-Reactor-
Kinetics (PRK) model. The accident is similarly initiated with a primary depressurization 
near the hot duct but without control rod insertion. The reactor core quickly reduces in 
power to decay power levels for a major part of the scenario. The enabled PRK model 
allows for the calculation of when recriticality occurs. This is estimated to occur well 
beyond 300 hours into the accident. The third D-LOFC study, by Lommers et al. (2014), 
investigates the AREVA SC-HTGR. It has a core thermal power of 625 MW and an initial 
fuel temperature near 625oC. The porous-media based thermal hydraulic solver Star-CD 
version 4.14, CD-adapco (2014), was used in this analysis. Nominal decay heating was 
assumed (i.e., control rods inserted or fuel temperature reactivity feedback/shutdown). 
 For the nominal core configuration and operating conditions typical of each reactor 




GTHTR300, General Atomics (1996)], the average and maximum fuel temperatures over 
the D-LOFC accident are plotted in Figure. 2.1. 
 
The Japanese GTHTR-300 has the highest fuel temperature. However, it is still 
below the expected fuel failure condition of 1600oC. The fuel assembly configuration of 
the GTHTR-300 is substantially different than either the AVERA SC-HTGR or MHTGR, 
which could account for the difference. For all cases, the temperatures reach a peak 
between 60-120 hours. This is due to the lag between the vessel heat removal and decay 
heat generation. As the vessel heats up, more heat is removed from the vessel to auxiliary 
cooling systems such as the RCCS. As time passes, heat generation decreases until it 
matches vessel heat removal.  
D-LOFC cases have the potential to challenge internal structures such as the core 
barrel and reduce the structural integrity of graphite support structures by oxidation. 
Sensitivity studies by Kim et al. (2010) underscore the potential weakness of the VHTR 
 


































for D-LOFC cases when the RCCS fails to operate. The highly reliable system could fail 
by introducing an air-flow blockage in the intake, exhaust, or cooling panel structures as 
could be the case during a large pipe break. Transient analysis was performed with the 
GAMMA+ code. Cases with reactor cavity insulation, without insulation, and with large 
thermal conductivities for soil and concrete were analyzed for the D-LOFC with no RCCS 
available. Some transient cases were simulated for 2500 hours or more. A key finding in 
the analysis is that the reactor cavity insulation serves as a dominant obstacle against heat 
transfer where heat is transferred primarily by conduction from the fuel to the soil 
surrounding containment. The limiting maximum temperatures may not occur in the fuel 
but in the vessel material. In just a few hours, the vessel temperature exceeds the 
recommended limit of 560°C for reactor vessel steel (9Cr1Mo). Fuel temperatures exceed 
1600°C around 50 hours when reactor vessel temperatures are near 800°C. Opportunity 
exists to turn around core and RPV temperatures at 100 hours if the soil and concrete have 
thermal conductivity values 10 times the standard values. Based on these findings, there is 
a need for an alternate reactor cavity heat removal mechanism for the VHTR for a D-LOFC 
case with no RCCS availability. It should be noted that the AREVA SC-HTGR design 
utilizes a water cooled RCCS. However, it is just as prone to blockage or worse leakage as 
the air-cooled system. For instances with the failure of either RCCS system, alternate 
cooling mechanisms will be required. 
Instead of cooling the reactor cavity, it may be possible to directly cool the reactor 
vessel through a variety of methods. Options include: external cooling by an active fan 
system placed beneath the vessel, an internal vessel cooling system by segregating the 
primary coolant helium from vessel cooling helium, and placing an additional insulation 
layer between the core and vessel wall.  Of the three options, Kim et al. (2008) found that 
the insulation layer was the most viable and offered the greatest reduction of RPV 
temperatures. Possible insulation options include Microtherm or Superwool 607 materials 




The penalty of adding an insulation material layer is seen in the associated increase in fuel 
temperatures. There is a tradeoff between decreasing vessel temperatures and increasing 
fuel temperatures. As mentioned earlier, some increase in fuel temperatures could be 
acceptable as vessel temperatures generally exceed their respective limits before the fuel 
does. 
In summary, P-LOFC and D-LOFC scenarios when the RCCS operates normally 
are not expected to raise fuel temperatures beyond their limits. If the RCCS does not 
operate or only partially operates, then vessel temperatures could quickly exceed their limit 
suggesting that a backup or alternate method for reactor cavity cooling should be 
investigated. Vessel cooling options such as adding an insulation layer could mitigate the 
need for an alternate reactor cavity cooling system. Although P-LOFC scenarios are not as 
challenging from a fuel perspective as the D-LOFC cases, one remaining issue could be 
that upper head and vessel temperatures increase beyond their acceptable limit. Therefore, 
it is still necessary to simulate this event. Additional insulation could be placed in these 
regions to reduce the inner wall temperatures. In that case, the RCCS, either water or air-
cooled, should be sized accordingly. 
2.3 Upper Plenum LOFC Implications 
 To establish whether natural circulation will be present in the HTGR during a loss-
of-forced-convection accident, the flow in both the core and upper plenum must be 
experimentally verified. Buoyancy forces result in hot gases flowing upward through the 
core and into the upper plenum above the core. Flow in the core coolant channels is 
important since it establishes the inlet velocity and temperature condition into the upper 
plenum. Once in the upper plenum, the amount of mixing, and the specific flow patterns 
that develop will determine the heat transfer to the vessel upper head and into the riser 
channels along the vessel wall. Finally, heat transfer away from the vessel wall is critical 




 Experimental facilities for testing vessel and plenum flows have been constructed 
at Oregon State University and at Idaho National Laboratory, Johnson and ASME (2009). 
These test facilities have been designed to measure flows similar to those expected in 
HTGRs at shutdown with and without forced circulation. Natural circulation is particularly 
important to measure since it is critical in transferring heat away from the core to the vessel 
wall, where it can then be removed by the RCCS. To properly scale these facilities so that 
similar flow behavior can be observed, fluid Richardson and Reynolds numbers for the 
experiment must match the HTGR high temperature helium conditions. In most cases, low 
temperature water is chosen to be the experimental working fluid since the fluid properties 
of both fluids are similar enough that both the Richardson and Reynolds numbers can be 
matched (i.e., Ri Rim p=  and Re Rem p= ) with similar characteristic diameters ( HD ). A 
schematic of the PIV upper plenum flow experiment at INL is shown in Figure 2.2. 
 
 
 Using the channel diameter as the characteristic dimension and the channel 
temperature rise, corresponding HTGR helium temperatures can be computed using the 
flow and temperature results from McVay et al. (2015). Complete matching of the 
 
Figure 2.2 INL Upper Plenum PIV Experimental Schematic 




Richardson and/or Reynolds numbers may not be possible for all locations within vessel. 
In particular, when the channel dimensions and temperatures are used to match Richardson 
numbers, expected helium channel Reynolds only numbers differ by a factor of 0.4 to 1.0. 
Assuming that the Richardson number is the more relevant parameter to match between 
the experiment and the HTGR, for some particular Reynolds numbers, the corresponding 
HTGR helium temperatures are plotted in Figure 2.3.  
 
From Figure 2.3, for realistic core helium temperatures, the Reynolds number ratio 
should be between 0.4 and 1.0. This corresponds to channel average temperatures between 
390 and 820oC. Outside this range, peak (hot) helium temperatures greater 1,300oC could 
challenge internal vessel structures and cold temperatures below 120oC would require inner 
vessel wall temperatures well below expected values during RCCS operation. 
For the same working fluid, very few adjustments could be made to the experiment 
to better match helium conditions in the coolant channels during a LOFC accident. Under 
natural circulation, mass flow cannot be altered without changing channel power or fluid 
 
Figure 2.3 Helium Coolant Channel Temperatures as a Function of Reynolds 




properties. Similar to mass flow, temperature rise also cannot be easily modified without 
changing power. Considering channel power is strictly chosen to reflect certain decay 
power conditions, it should not be modified unless a different accident time-frame is 
selected. Water properties are predominantly affected by the average temperature and not 
pressure. Thus, increasing or decreasing system pressure will not likely alter the fluid 
property values in the Richardson and Reynolds numbers. Finally, it is possible that other 
fluids could have more favorable properties and be a better substitute, but then PIV may or 
may not be possible. Consequently, only the water average temperature and channel 
diameter can be reasonably adjusted. 
If the channel diameter is increased, (e.g., , 0.03 H mD m= ), then the applicable 
helium Reynolds numbers are reduced to 0.45 – 0.6 that of water. Decreasing channel 
diameter (e.g., , 0.012 H mD m= ) has the opposite effect of expanding possible helium 
Reynolds numbers to 0.3 – 1.3. Minor experimental channel diameter changes lead to either 
Reynolds number ratios too small or the range being too broad. Thus, current experimental 
channel diameters are best suited to model helium conditions using water. 
Matching Richardson numbers in upper and lower plenums is more of an 
approximation than for the channels due to mixing and complex flow behavior. The 
difficulty arises in defining a suitable characteristic length or hydraulic diameter (
4 /
H F W
D A P= ⋅  ), as well as the temperature difference that is represented. In an INL report 
by McCreery and Condie (2006), it has been suggested that the distance and outlet 
temperature between channels be used for both the upper and lower plenums. Unlike the 
case of the core coolant channels, a range of possible upper plenum average temperatures 
is possible for a single specified Reynolds number ratio. Based on the same upper plenum 
experiment, and assuming the model temperature difference is 0.5oC, which was the 




outlet temperature, the prototype (HTGR) outlet temperature difference between channels 
is plotted in Figure 2.4.  
 
One constraint on the upper plenum is the temperature of the coolant entering the 
upper plenum. From Figure 2.3 it is observed that the hot temperature could vary between 
600 and 1,300oC. This forces the upper plenum Reynolds number ratio to a maximum of 
0.15 to 0.2. This is a slight underestimation since the average temperature is expected to 
be slightly below the hot temperature due to heat loss. If the water temperature difference 
is smaller, at 0.1oC, the curves in Figure 2.4 shift down and the maximum upper plenum 
Reynolds number ratio is closer to 0.5 to 0.6. For Reynolds number ratios closer to unity, 
the estimated temperature difference between channels is larger than what is reasonably 
expected for the HTGR. 
For either the channel or plenum case, with matching Richardson numbers and 
channel powers, the observed water flow patterns best resemble helium flows with 
Reynolds numbers that are a factor of 2 to 8 smaller in the upper plenum and only 1 to 2 
 




smaller in the channels. The expected helium velocity is nearly constant for any of the cases 
in Figure 2.3 or Figure 2.4. If the distorted helium Reynolds numbers do not significantly 
impede helium flow, from Figure 2.3, anticipated helium core temperature rise is between 
400 – 700oC. For stable core temperatures, this core temperature rise must be offset by the 
temperature drop along the vessel wall and upper plenum due to operation of the Reactor 
Cavity Cooling System (RCCS). Therefore, in addition to verifying vessel flow and 
corresponding core temperature rise, temperature drop along the vessel and RCCS 
performance must be verified to ensure LOFC and transient safety. 
2.4 RCCS Performance Studies 
For the VHTR, there are two RCCS designs currently under discussion. The first is 
an air-cooled system that was initially proposed by General Atomics, as reported in 
Thielman et al. (2005). The second type is an active, cold (< 30oC), constant water flow 
system proposed by AREVA, as reported in Lommers et al. (2012). For the second type, if 
forced circulation is lost, heat is removed by boiling and enough water inventory is present 
in the system to maintain vessel heat removal for 72 hours. The main benefit of the first 
system over the second is its reduced failure probability associated with any loss of fluid 
inventory, and indefinite capacity without forced circulation. For both systems, radiation 
and heat conduction occurs from the outer vessel wall, across the reactor cavity, to the 
RCCS risers where heat is carried away to the environment either via natural circulation 
open air ducts, as in the case of the General Atomics design, or via an intermediate heat 
exchanger connected to the environment, as in the case of the AREVA design. Both RCCS 






A small-scale (1:23) RCCS experimental test facility based on the water-cooled 
AREVA system was constructed at Texas A&M University. The purpose of this facility is 
to measure representative heat duties by the RCCS and to observe the flow distribution in 
the RCCS riser channels. Experimental results by Vaghetto and Hassan (2014) seem to 
confirm the ability of the RCCS to passively remove the required heat from the reactor 
vessel. Figure 2.6 shows a schematic of the experimental facility.  
 
Figure 2.5 Passive RCCS Designs for HTGRs, (a) Adapted from Williams et al. 





RCCS water temperatures and flow rates were measured as 6 kW of heat was 
applied to the vessel wall from electric heaters. Accounting for heat losses, about ~ 4.8 kW
was transferred across the test apparatus. A secondary loop connected to an ice-bath was 
used as the heat sink. Once steady state was achieved, secondary inlet and outlet 
temperatures were maintained around 27 and 31oC respectively, while primary RCCS 
water was measured at 31 and 33oC. These temperatures are not unique as they could be 
adjusted by increasing or decreasing the secondary flow rate through the ice-bath. The 
critical value of interest was the measured primary coolant flow rate through the loop. For 
these temperatures, at steady state, the flow rate was found to be ~32 /minl . This 
corresponds to an average water velocity of 0.029 /m s through each riser channel. 
However, there was non-uniform flow across the riser distribution manifolds due to flow 
geometry, and possible non-uniform heating due to thermal radiation. 
Qualitative flow visualization at the riser inlet and outlet manifolds was performed 
to assess the flow distribution through each of the riser channels. It was observed that 
channels closer to the riser outlet have higher flow than channels closer to the riser inlet. 
This is most likely a result of the manifold or plenum geometry used in the experiment. 
Nevertheless, these observations could be valuable for VHTR RCCS design and possibly 
 
Figure 2.6 Experimental RCCS Facility as Described in  




selecting those channels with a higher imposed heat flux to have a higher flow rate. This 
would lower the average outer surface temperature, which is important for maximizing 
radiation heat transfer from the vessel. However, it may be more beneficial to minimize 
the total flow resistance of the system without preference to individual channels. More 
study is needed to adequately address all of the potential design tradeoffs for developing 
the RCCS. 
A RELAP5-3D simulation was performed by Vaghetto and Hassan (2014) using 
the RCCS experimental configuration described above and in Figure 2.6. The purpose of 
this simulation was to support computer code verification and identify weaknesses and/or 
limitations of the code. One unique aspect of the study was the computation of radiation 
view factors using the NEVADATM software, T.A.C. Technologies (2000), and the 
combined mode heat transfer modeling of the RCCS panels and riser pipe fins. For the 
same experimental conditions, simulated cavity flowrates and temperatures were found to 
be in satisfactory agreement with the experimental data. Thus, it was judged by the authors 
that RELAP5-3D is acceptable for RCCS and vessel heat removal prediction. 
Additionally, CFD simulations of the upper plenum vessel wall and RCCS cavity 
were performed by Frisani and Hassan (2014). This study had a similar purpose, to verify 
the commercial CFD software and its models (STAR-CCM+/V5.02.009) for RCCS 
simulation and vessel heat removal prediction. One benefit of CFD over experiments and 
RELAP5-3D is that detailed temperature distributions over the vessel and riser pipes can 
be computed. This could allow for optimization of RCCS panels and riser pipes. Seven 
cases were analyzed with varying system size/power, and pipe configurations. Six of the 
seven cases had a uniform inner vessel heat flux boundary condition of 3.75 kw/m2. Five 
cases assumed a riser pipe uniform temperature boundary condition of 100oC which 
corresponds to boiling of the RCCS riser water coolant. The other two assume forced 
convection in the riser pipes, one with a low flowrate (U0 = 0.0114 m/s) and one with a 




temperature ranged from 341 – 478oC depending on riser pitch-to-diameter ratio, number 
of pipes and panel length modeled. 
Using the outer vessel temperatures and heat flux values from the reference CFD 
simulations, inner wall and vessel helium conditions are estimated by hand calculation 
here. For the expected vessel steel, SA533, the thermal conductivity at 600oC is around 43 
W/m-K. This increases with lower temperatures, and is therefore a conservative value for 
the temperature range described here. The expected upper head vessel thickness is 15.6 cm. 
For the RPV outer wall temperatures above, and treating the RPV wall as a plane wall, this 
corresponds to steady state inner wall temperatures between 355 – 492oC. The upper 
plenum helium temperature, based on the calculations and observations from experiments, 
is expected to be in the range of 600 – 1300oC. For a heat flux of 3.75 kW/m2, this 
corresponds to a necessary minimum helium convective heat transfer coefficient in the 
range of 4 – 12 W/m2-K, assuming the helium can interact directly with the inner surface 
of the vessel head. Since average outer vessel wall temperatures are lower, roughly around 
275oC, the necessary minimum convective heat transfer coefficients are slightly lower. 
For the VHTR at a decay power of 0.5% total operating power, a total of 1.75 MW 
must be removed from the vessel. Using the temperatures and expected heat transfer 
coefficients as described above, the fraction of heat removed by the upper vessel head is 
estimated by hand calculation here. The upper plenum inner surface area can be 
approximated as a half-sphere with only a faction available for active heat removal. Some 
of the upper head area is covered by control rod drive and fuel handling components. 
Conservatively, if 50% of the area is available (A ≈ 83 m2), this leads to ≈ 311 kW or only 
18% of the total heat generated being removed in the upper plenum. However, helium 
convective heat transfer coefficients should be slightly higher, at around 18 – 20 W/m2-K. 
This would lead to slightly higher vessel surface temperatures and larger heat flux values 
through the upper plenum wall. If the wall heat flux is closer to 5 kW/m2, then 23% or 




considering the height of the vessel (h ≈12 m) and corresponding total vessel surface area, 
there is sufficient margin to remove the necessary power using the saturated water-cooled 
RCCS. Additional experimental testing is needed to verify these CFD models, as well as 
with higher or varying heat flux values through the upper head and vessel wall. 
2.5 Additional Safety Concerns 
 For the HTGR, pressurized and de-pressurized LOFC accidents are the principal 
design basis accident scenarios, Ryskamp (2003). For these events to be successful (i.e., 
fuel temperature does not exceed specified failure limits), there must be sufficient 
circulation in the vessel to transfer heat from the core to the vessel walls, and the RCCS 
must be capable of removing heat from the vessel wall to the environment. Preliminary 
experimental and CFD results, as described in the previous sections, show that this is 
possible for select steady state power levels, RCCS temperatures, and different RCCS 
designs. However, the core power is initially much higher than the powers used in the 
studies mentioned in the previous sections. There is also some transient heatup, and spatial 
variations are not considered in the previous studies. Additionally, there are some more 
complex material and chemical interaction accidents that could pose safety challenges for 
the HTGR. See papers by Oh and Kim (2010) for discussion and analysis of air ingress 
accidents and Zhang et al. (2005) for water ingress accidents.  
 The primary risk for air ingress occurs during a loss of coolant (LOCA) or pipe 
break scenario. The primary risk for water ingress occurs during a break of a connected 
system barrier (e.g., shutdown cooling system pipe) into the primary system. For either of 
these accidents, similar D-LOFC accident behavior is expected but with the addition of 
graphite oxidation reactions within the core. For air-ingress, cold environmental air, at 20-
25oC, is assumed to circulate through the vessel. Recent work by Haque (2008) shows that 
this lower temperature inlet air leads to lower expected maximum fuel temperatures, even 




Similarly, for water-ingress accidents, core decay heat is still principally removed by the 
RCCS and the additional low temperature water sources act to reduce peak fuel 
temperatures. Reactivity is only a concern for water-ingress cases when the control rods 
fail to insert. For the MHTGR, small leak sequences (0.05 kg/sec) were found to have no 
or bounded calculation of radionuclide releases. Moderate leak sequences (5.7 kg/sec) 
force a reactor trip very early into the accident sequence on either moisture monitor 
detection or high power-to-flow ratio. 
 Based on the results presented by Oh and Kim (2010, 2011), Zhang et al. (2005), 
Haque (2008), Williams et al. (1989), fuel heat-up and peak fuel temperatures are not a 
larger concern for the air/water ingress cases than for the standard D-LOFC accidents. 
However, there are many other valid non-core thermal hydraulic concerns with these 
ingress accidents. Possibly the largest concern is the structural integrity of the lower 
plenum graphite post-oxidation, NGNP Moisture Ingress Assessment Committee (2011). 
Cracks and other defects could develop as a result of oxidation potentially leading to failure 
of core support structures. This could then lead to a number of different flow blockages 
and geometrical configurations that prohibit decay heat removal.  
For the steam generator configured HTGR, this represents a significant water 
source if a break were to occur into the primary system. A potential hazard with water-
ingress accidents is the generation of hydrogen gas. This phenomenon has been a 
thoroughly assessed issue for most LWR plants. For HTGRs, this has not been investigated 
and without hydrogen mitigation systems, hydrogen combustion could occur in the 
containment leading to failure of RCCS and other vital systems.  
Fortunately a CFD study by Oh et al. (2011) showed that these safety concerns 
could be mitigated by an economically affordable and simple helium injection system. As 
little as 0.5 m/s helium injected in the lower plenum could reduce air concentrations from 





 Considering all the possible safety solutions for non-LOFC accidents, it is critical 
to ensure that safety criteria are met for the LOFC accidents. Therefore, the principal effort 
in this dissertation is to model and simulate the HTGR under both D- and P-LOFC 
accidents. This work is significant considering: (1) there is a lack of non-CFD HTGR 
thermal-hydraulic methods that model the prismatic fuel assemblies in their original 
hexagonal arrangement, (2) fine mesh CFD methods are not equipped to simulate the whole 
core and primary system over the course of a long transient (100+ hours), and (3) realistic 
power profiles have not been fully employed in the various LOFC safety studies. The next 
chapter presents the transient unit-cell method and fluid procedures to simulate the core 













3.  PHYSICAL MODELING 
 The transient HTGR thermal hydraulic method developed here can be divided into 
two key areas: (1) the solid and fluid node heat transfer models, which are discussed in this 
chapter, and (2) the numerical scheme and associated boundary models, which are 
discussed in the following chapter. The key physical models described in this chapter 
include: (a) solid node graphite and fuel unit cell models, (b) transient core channel and 
vessel fluid models, and (c) the vessel heat structures, mainly the vessel wall for RCCS 
heat removal estimation.  
The solid node graphite and fuel unit cell models are essentially the same as those 
described in Huning et al. (2016) and in Huning (2014). The transient fluid models are 
substantially different than those used for the steady state analysis. For steady state 
calculations, a simple uniform pressure drop condition across all the core channels dictated 
the mass flow distribution. It was also assumed that the RCCS did not impact the steady 
state temperature distribution; therefore, the vessel wall and other heat structures such as 
the cross duct, Shutdown Cooling System (SCS) walls, and connected Primary Conversion 
System (PCS) were not modeled.  
There are many advantages of using the unit cell method and 1-D transient fluid 
models. The primary advantage is the ability of this method to compute whole core 
temperature distributions at any given time during the transient accident. This is not 
currently possible using CFD. Coarse systems-level codes such as RELAP can do this, but 
as will be shown in Chapter 6, significant fuel geometry assumptions must be made. 
Computational time is still a moderate concern as simulations can take a week or longer 
using a small cluster (8-24 nodes). Therefore, reducing the cell model dimensions beyond 




3.1 Unit Cell Modeling Approach 
 The solid node graphite and fuel unit cell modeling approach is described here. The 
purpose of this modeling approach is to compute the transient temperature profile within 
the graphite and fuel of the active core hexagonal fuel assembly blocks and solid reflector 
blocks. The prismatic HTGR reactor core consists of stacked hexagonal graphite assembly 
blocks with inner and outer reflector regions and a middle active core region as shown in 
Figure 1.1. Each fuel assembly has alternating fuel and coolant channels and is either a 
standard fuel assembly or a control fuel assembly with a single large hole reserved for a 
system shutdown or control rod. Both fuel assembly types are shown in Figure 1.2. Fuel 
and reflector assemblies also contain a central handling hole used to position blocks around 
the core. Burnable poison pins, which control reactivity over the fuel cycle, are placed on 
the corners of assemblies. The unit-cell discretization methodology is shown schematically 









The differential thermal energy equation within a graphite or cylindrical fuel cell is 
given by Eq. (3.1) where T  is the temperature at some spatial point, t  is time, q is heat 









q             (3.1) 
 Averaging over the unit cell volume, the differential thermal energy equation is 
transformed into Eq. (3.2). For Eq. (3.2), an inner unit cell geometry is assumed since the 
number of sides for heat conduction is eight (six radially and two in the axial direction). 
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 The heat flux between unit cells is approximated using a first-order Fourier’s law 
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Thus for a given initial temperature distribution, the new temperature distribution 
can be found by substituting Eq. (3.3) and integrating both sides of Eq. (3.2). More 
information about the time integration scheme employed can be found in the next chapter. 
Specific design values and dimensions for the MHTGR core, vessel and unit cell 
discretization can be found in Table 3.1. 
Table 3.1. Relevant MHTGR Design Parameters 
Core and Vessel Configuration 
# Fuel Compacts 13572 - 
# Large Coolant Channels 6564 - 
# Small Coolant Channels 408 - 
# Bypass Gaps 751 - 
Upper Plenum Flow Area 4.24 m2 
Riser Flow Area 1.21 m2 
Lower Plenum Flow Area 3.45 m2 
Upper Plenum DH 0.143 m 
Riser DH 0.247 m 
Lower Plenum DH 0.586 m 
Riser Height 11.9 m 
Fuel Assembly Design 
Assembly Flat-to-Flat Diameter 0.36 m 
Fuel Compact Diameter 12.45 mm 
Fuel Compact Gap Width 0.30 mm 
Large Coolant Channel Diameter 15.86 mm 
Small Coolant Channel Diameter 12.70 mm 
Unit Cell Discretization Parameters 
Unit Cell Pitch 18.80 mm 
Inner Unit Cell Side Length 10.85 mm 
Inner Unit Cell Side Surface Area 8.604·10-3 m2 
Number of Axial Zones 10 - 
Unit Cell Axial Height 0.793 m 
3.2 Initial Temperature and Power Distributions 
For steady state calculations, the volumetric energy generation rate is held to the 
constant design specified level. An arbitrary initial temperature distribution is assumed and 




time-steps when the heat generation rate matches the heat removal rate by core helium 
convection. For transient calculations, this computed steady state temperature distribution 
is used as the initial temperature distribution. The temperature distribution then changes 
over time as the heat generation rate changes.  
The initial temperature distribution used for all of the transient LOFC cases 
presented here is the result of a detailed coupled neutronics analysis by Connolly et al. 
(2016). In this paper, the movement of control rods was investigated and a near-critical 
configuration for the MHTGR was found. The specific control rod configuration is shown 
in Figure 3.3.   
 
 This configuration was found by first performing a steady state coupled thermal-
hydraulic and neutronics analysis with a reactor configuration with no control rods inserted. 
Control rods are grouped into two batches: inner reflector rods, and outer reflector rods. 
After performing several separate steady state coupled analyses with different control rod 
patterns, it was determined that the configuration shown in Figure 3.3 was the most 
optimal. This was determined to be the most optimal since it was the case with a core-
eigenvalue closest to unity ( 1k ≈ ). Rods were inserted in 1/10th increments to minimize 
 




the number of potential coupled analysis cases while still having enough movement 
resolution to achieve near-criticality.  
 From the coupled analysis with control rods inserted as shown in Figure 3.3, the 3-
D power and temperature distributions were obtained. The power distribution is shown in 
Figure 3.4. For the transient analysis, this represents the initial power distribution at time 
zero.  
 
 Without inner control rods inserted completely, the power peaks significantly along 
the inner reflector block fuel region. As shown in Figure 3.4, the power now peaks along 
the outer reflector block fuel region. This is expected since the outer control rods are 
removed at this location in the core. Since the MHTGR is a thermal spectrum reactor, the 
graphite reflector blocks are considerably important for thermalizing the fast neutrons 
emitted during fission. As neutrons become more thermalized, their mean-free-path, or 
 




their ability to penetrate material, becomes smaller and they are subsequently absorbed by 
the Uranium based TRISO fuel along the outer reflector block periphery. The fuel 
temperature distribution corresponding to this case is shown in Figure 3.5. 
 
Coolant enters the top portion of the core and exits at the bottom. Thus, the fuel 
temperature, as shown in Figure 3.4, also increases from top to bottom. It can be clearly 
seen that the steady state fuel temperature distribution is influenced by the power 
distribution. Steady state results for a variety of different sensitivity studies and expanded 
discussion can be found in Huning et al. (2016). For the transient cases, this influence is 
minimized since the overall decay power level drops to a fraction of the steady state power. 
3.3 Transient Fluid Modeling 
 For steady state, the coolant distribution entering the core at the top of the vessel is 
determined by preforming a pressure drop balance, and then setting it equal across all the 
 




channels and bypass gaps. For the MHTGR, a standard CFD procedure is used to compute 
both the pressure and flow distribution across the core. The complete procedure is 
described in Matrineau and Berry (2004). The main difference between that work and the 
method described here is the approximation of 1-D channels for MHTGR fluid volumes.  
 The fluid volumes for the MHTGR include: small and large coolant channels within 
the graphite assembly blocks, flat channel bypass gaps between the hexagonal assembly 
blocks, the upper and lower plenums, and a riser channel. These volumes are shown in 
Figure 3.6.  
 
 The core fluid volumes are discretized into increments similar to the solid nodes, 
typically ten axial segments. The nodes are approximated as 1-D since the flow in either 
normal operation or shutdown is primarily in one loop direction. In Figure 3.6, for steady 
state normal operation, the junction linking the lower plenum (L.P.) and the riser does not 
exist. Instead, the L.P. connects to an outlet plenum. However, since shutdown and loss of 
flow accident cases are the ones primarily considered here, this L.P. to riser junction was 
introduced to simplify the fluid transport around the vessel. In the MHTGR, and it is 
expected for other HTGR designs as well, there will be additional lower volumes in the 
base of the vessel for forced circulation, shutdown cooling systems. These are not expected 
 




to be functional for any of the events considered here, and can be safely neglected since 
these additional volumes do not participate in heat transfer away from the core nor are they 
large enough to significantly impede the recirculation flow.   
  The goal of the transient fluid modeling is to provide convective heat transfer 
estimates in the core as well as to the vessel wall. This is accomplished by using standard 
heat transfer correlations for the applicable flow regime. This convective heat removal rate 
is then subtracted/added to surrounding core graphite as well as added/subtracted from the 
helium energy. The helium energy calculation is performed simultaneously with other fluid 
equations for mass and momentum. The solid node energy calculations are performed 
independently during a larger time-step. A description of the time-step implementation for 
the fluid and solid node calculations is included in the next chapter.  
The general method is adapted from Matrineau and Berry (2004). In this paper, the 
pressure-corrected implicit continuous-fluid Eulerian finite element method (PCICE-FEM) 
for compressible ideal gas, 2-D geometry is described in detail. The main benefit of this 
computational fluid dynamics (CFD) scheme compared to other semi-implicit or fully 
implicit schemes, is that the energy equation is sufficiently coupled to the pressure equation 
through the equation of state, or ideal gas equation, to avoid excessive outer iterations 
common to other schemes without energy equation coupling.  
Several simplifications and assumptions are made to this method to allow for 
HTGR, whole-vessel flow distributions to be calculated. The first assumption is that fluid 
volumes can be treated as 1-D. This significantly reduces the number of meshes and 
calculations. It also allows for well-established heat transfer and pressure drop correlations 
to be used. The second assumption is that finite difference versions of the governing 
equations are solved, instead of finite-elements. The third is that smoothing of explicit 
predictor terms with artificial dissipation is neglected. In this section, a summary of the 




A staggered grid is used for the momentum equation. The mass and energy 
equations are solved using the discretization shown in Figure 3.6. However, for the 
momentum equation, volumes are positioned over the inlet and outlets of the volumes used 
for the mass and energy calculations. The primary benefit is that the fluid velocity at the 
inlet/outlets, which is more critical to the mass and energy conservation, can be computed. 
This is shown in Figure 3.7. 
 
 Additional velocities, such as the ones at points “i” or “i+1”, can be computed from 
linear interpolation. Similarly, for mass and energy, interpolation is used for the values at 
points “j” or “j+1”. It should be noted that the fluid pressure (P) is computed on the same 
grid as the mass/energy (the “i” points).  
The fluid governing equations for mass, momentum, and energy are listed in Eq. 
(3.4) through Eq. (3.6). The principal variables of interest are: density (ρ), velocity (u), and 
specific fluid energy ( e ) where: 
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Several assumptions are made to present the governing equations in this form. 
These include: (1) single component, single phase helium, (2) the viscous and surface 
frictional forces are encapsulated in the variable, fF , (3) no thermal dissipation, and (4) 
heat transfer between the fluid and surface is captured by the variable, . .H Tq . Additionally, 
helium is assumed to be a perfect, ideal gas with constant specific heats (at constant 
pressure, 5193 [J/kg-K]Pc = , and at constant volume, 3116 [J/kg-K]Vc = ). This 
assumption allows for easy determination of the fluid temperature via the internal energy (
Vi c T∆ = ∆ ). The corresponding pressure can also be easily computed from Eq. (3.7) which 
is derived from the ideal gas law. 
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                                Eq. (3.7) 
The volumetric heat transfer variable, . .H Tq , for some volume “j” is shown below 
in Eq. (3.8) where: . .H TA and surfT are the surface area and temperature respectively, jV  and 
j
T are the fluid volume and average fluid temperature respectively, and convh is the average 
convective heat transfer coefficient for the corresponding flow regime in the volume. 
( ). .. . H TH T conv surf j
j
A
q h T T
V
= −                                    Eq. (3.8) 
The heat transfer coefficients for laminar ( Re 2100< ) and turbulent flow (
Re 2100≥ ) for the core coolant channels can be computed from the laminar constant heat 
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Eq. (3.10) 
For Reynolds numbers less than 2100, Eq. (3.10) reduces to Eq. (3.9), but Eq. (3.9) 
is used instead to reduce the mathematical operations associated with Eq. (3.10). The 
frictional pressure drop variable, fF , in Eq. (3.5) and friction factor ( f ) used in Eq. (3.10) 
can be determined from Eq. (3.11) and either Eq. (3.12) or Eq. (3.13) for laminar and 
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Eq. (3.13)                                                       
     
Graphite surface roughness ( sε ) is dependent on various factors; therefore, an 
approximation of [ ]10s mε µ= is used in this method for simplicity.  
As is common to many computational fluid dynamics methods, the fluid pressure 
cannot be explicitly determined from the solution of just the governing equations in Eq. 
(3.4), Eq. (3.5), and Eq. (3.6). The pressure distribution is determined simultaneously 
through the use of a “pressure – correction” (Poisson) equation. This equation is derived in 
Matrineau and Berry (2004) and is shown here in Eq. (3.14) as a starting point along with 
the already presented fluid conservation equations and thermodynamic relationships. Key 
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− ∆ ∇⋅∇ + = − − ∆ ∇⋅               Eq. (3.14) 
Table 3.2. Transient Fluid Variables and Parameters 
Discretization Parameters 
Variable Description Units 
t∆  Time-step size (typically ~0.001s) s 
n  Current time-step number (these are known quantities) - 
ϕ  Partial time-step advancement size ( 0 1ϕ< < , typically ~0.5) - 
n ϕ+  Next partial time-step  - 
1n +  Next time-step number - 
*
x  Explicitly computed next time-step scalar quantity “ x ” x  
x̂   Explicit partial time-step scalar quantity “x”:
( )*ˆ 1 nx x xϕ ϕ= + −  
x  
xδ  Explicit change of “x”: ( ) 1n nx x xφδ ϕ+ −= − ⋅  x  
Fluid Variables and Properties 
Pn  Current time-step (mass-centered) pressure Pa 
P  Corrected next time-step pressure Pa 
Pδ  Hybrid pressure, defined as: ( )P P Pnδ ϕ= −  Pa 
T  Temperature (mass-centered) K 
ρ  Density (mass-centered) 3/kg m  
R Helium ideal gas constant: 2077P VR c c= − =  J kg K⋅  
( )uρ  Mass flux (staggered grid)  2/kg m s  
( )eρ
 
Fluid volumetric energy (mass-centered) 3/J m  
 
Eq. (3.14) is then interpreted for the specific fluid volumes of interest. These 
include: core coolant channels with similar flow areas and lengths, and upper/lower 
plenums, which connect to the core coolant channels but have differing geometric 
parameters. Each core coolant channel is assumed to have only one “inlet” and “outlet”. 
For this simple case, the Poisson equation in Eq. (3.14) is transformed into Eq. (3.15) with 




current node, and 1j +  being the downstream node. Staggered grid (boundary) mass flux 
subscripts inj  and outj  refer to the inlet and outlet respectively.  
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    Eq. (3.15) 
 
If the core coolant channel nodes are the top or bottom, then the appropriate plenum 
lengths and pressures are substituted into Eq. (3.15). The Poisson equations for the upper 
and lower plenum are similar, but boundary conditions for mass flux or pressure are used 
to put the system into a solvable system for all the mass-centered hybrid pressure terms (
j
Pδ ). The set of Poisson equations is then combined into a linear system of the form: 
[ ] [ ] [ ]A P Bδ⋅ = . The system is solved using a simple Gaussian elimination method. Once 
all the hybrid pressures are known, the corrected pressure is computed (
1P  PnPϕ δ−= ⋅ + ). 
The corrected values for density, junction mass flux, and fluid energy can then be computed 
using Eq. (3.16) through Eq. (3.18) respectively. The complete procedure is outlined in 
Table 3.3. 
( ) ( )
1 *1 *, nn n
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Table 3.3 Transient Fluid Procedure 
Beginning of time-step “n” 
1 
Solve for the explicit partial time-step values: 







from Eq. (3.4) and Eq. (3.5) 
2 Compute δρ  and ( )uδ ρ  
3 Estimate convective heat transfer, . .H Tq , at n ϕ+  
4 
Solve for the explicit energy terms: ( )eδ ρ  and ( )
*
eρ  using 
Eq. (6) 
5 Compute all remaining fluid properties (ex. T̂ , *T , ρ̂ , *ρ ,…) 
6 Solve for Pδ and P using the appropriate forms of Eq. (14) 
7 Solve for the “corrected” values: 










Compute all new time-step thermodynamic and fluid property 
quantities from the newly computed density and energy using 
their respective relationships 
Proceed to next fluid time-step “n+1” 
The key accident scenarios of interest are the pressurized and depressurized LOFC 
accidents. For each case, it is assumed that pressure and flow equilibrium is quickly 
established after the forced circulation ceases. For the pressurized case, this means that the 
vessel is initially at the normal operating pressure (6.39 MPa) and the velocity is zero. For 
simplicity, the initial helium temperature is set to the graphite surface temperature of that 
node. The pressure distribution in the core initially is computed during the first fluid time-
step as outlined in Table 3.3.  
For the depressurized case, the vessel pressure is set to 1 MPa. The equilibrium 
pressure for the D-LOFC case is highly dependent on the containment volume and thermal-
fluid conditions. Containment design for the MHTGR is unclear and is an ongoing 
engineering project for many other HTGR designs. Therefore, it is preferable to assume a 
break boundary pressure rather than a specific containment design to generalize the 
transient and accident sequence. To determine what the vessel boundary pressure and 




parameters of interest should be specified: free gas volume, failure pressure, gas 
composition (helium/air/nitrogen), initial pressure, initial temperature, vessel and break 
elevation relative to the containment, break orientation and size, and containment height. 
Other geometry factors could be important, depending on the specific containment-vessel 
interaction and fluid flow. If the complete containment specifications and break geometry 
are known, the best method for determining the boundary conditions within the vessel 
would be to perform a detailed CFD simulation within the containment which includes a 
RCCS heat removal model.  
 Without knowing the containment geometry, another critical assumption for the D-
LOFC is made. This assumption is to neglect mass, energy and momentum transfer 
between the vessel fluid and the containment fluid. This implies that the fluid exiting the 
vessel is immediately returned at the same state. This is a conservative estimate since some 
of the fluid energy exiting the vessel will be transferred to the containment walls and 
ultimately the environment. Thus for the D-LOFC case, it is assumed that all the heat from 
the core must be removed from the RCCS and not by any external containment gas or 
cooling system.   
However, if complete containment failure does occur (pressure drops to 1 atm) and 
helium recirculation back to the vessel fails, this could ultimately lead to fuel failure. The 
containment of any nuclear reactor design or type is typically designed to withstand any 
vessel or primary system pipe break. Thus, these very low pressure conditions are less 
probable, will ultimately be classified as “beyond design basis”, and are outside the scope 
of the analyses presented here.  
3.4 RCCS Modeling 
 The Reactor Containment Cooling System (RCCS) is responsible for cooling the 
reactor in the event the Power Conversion Unit (PCU) and Shutdown Cooling System 




coolant through a heat exchanger that is cooled by low-temperature water on the secondary 
side. The PCU also consists of a helium circulator that forces the primary coolant through 
a heat exchanger (either a steam generator or turbo-generator) which is externally cooled. 
For a loss of all onsite and offsite power, neither the PCU nor SCS will be operational. 
Realistically, this will require the failure of onsite diesel power generators, batteries, or the 
electric transmission system in addition to the loss of offsite power. There are several 
possible, low probability initiating events that could lead to this configuration, also called 
a Station Blackout (SBO). The most recent, highly observed SBO event was the earthquake 
and subsequent tsunami that crippled the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant. Under an SBO, 
the RCCS is responsible for cooling the reactor to prevent a severe accident.  
 The RCCS operates by removing heat from the core by either air or water 
circulation along the containment walls. The air-cooled RCCS is a natural circulation 
system that draws cool air from the environment at a low elevation, it heats up along the 
containment wall that is underground, and then travels upward out an exhaust stack at a 








The water-cooled RCCS design relies on a large water volume above the 
containment walls at atmospheric pressure. As the containment walls heat up, the water 
evaporates and is released to the environment. The water volume is designed to be large 
enough to cool the containment walls for an extended period of time, typically around 3-7 
days. It should be noted that this water-cooled system is similar to what the Westinghouse 
AP-1000 design relies on for passive containment cooling.  
 In an LOFC, the reactor core and vessel heats up, thermal radiation and heat 
conduction occur in the containment between the vessel and containment walls. As the 
containment walls are cooled, the vessel cools down accordingly. Thus for a fixed 
containment, RCCS, and vessel design, heat removal from the RCCS is only coupled to 
the vessel wall. For simulating the transient and LOFC accidents, RCCS heat removal can 
be assumed to occur at the external vessel wall surface. This assumes the RCCS and 
containment materials have negligible thermal capacitance. For long or slowly progressing 
transients, the temperatures within these materials are assumed to be near steady state.  
 The MHTGR-350 design is assumed for the analyses presented here. In that reactor 
design, the air-cooled RCCS design is used. Using the assumption that the RCCS heat 
removal occurs at the vessel wall, RCCS performance is correlated as a function of external 
vessel wall temperature only. Using the LOFC results in the MHTGR preliminary safety 
documents, see Williams et al. (1989), the RCCS performance is correlated to vessel 





 This correlation for RCCS performance is used for the LOFC analyses presented 
here. This is done for a multitude of different reasons. The primary reason is that verifying 
RCCS performance and containment design can be achieved independently without 
considering the response from the core during an LOFC. Since RCCS performance is only 
coupled to the vessel wall, thermal-fluid experiments and CFD studies can easily be 
performed to verify RCCS heat removal. Several studies by Vaghetto and Hassan (2014) 
and others have shown that a sufficiently designed RCCS is capable of removing the 
necessary heat from the vessel wall. 
 The linear relationship in Figure 3.9 is somewhat unexpected since thermal 
radiation for a blackbody is function of surface temperature to the fourth power.  Since this 
is an air-cooled RCCS design, the containment wall temperature increases as the vessel 
wall temperature increases. This is in contract to the water-cooled RCCS design which 
maintains a nearly constant containment wall just above 100oC. Heat transfer between the 
vessel and containment wall is not exclusively by thermal radiation. Heat conduction is 
also present, which is linear with increasing temperature for constant thermal properties. 
 
 




These two effects are the principal contributors to the RCCS performance relationship 
shown in Figure 3.9.  
For future HTGR designs, this curve presents some motivation for using a water-
cooled RCCS design that would in principle have better performance at higher vessel 
temperatures than the air-cooled design. The major concern with the water-cooled RCCS 
is maintaining an intact source or volume of water. However, this may not be a concern if 
other water sources are nearby. Since this water would not come into contact with the 
reactor core, it can be assumed that there would be fewer restrictions on water quality than 
for typical LWR cooling systems. This could allow for common sources such as a lake or 
river possibly for RCCS cooling in the event the onsite volume of water was disrupted. 
However, to consider this as a passive system, a gravity driven system must be employed 
between the source and the RCCS. Additionally, there may be some concern with the air-
cooled system if the exhaust stack were destroyed. Without the additional height, 
recirculation could be affected. These RCCS issues are still a concern and should be 
addressed before any HTGR is certified.  
3.5 Summary of Critical Assumptions 
Most of the assumptions up to this point have been discussed along with the 
particular method being described in their representative chapter/section. This section 
reviews some of the more critical assumptions and lists some not previously mentioned.  
These assumptions are categorized by: modeling decision, neutronic, thermo-fluid, 
and numerical assumptions. Modeling decision assumptions refer to potentially important 
components and structures that were not chosen to be modeled in the LOFC simulations. 
Any components or structures not listed in this table are already modeled, such as the core 
fuel, graphite, select vessel volumes and walls, are not considered to be important to the 




of containment, non-safety related pumps, balance-of-plant components that would be 
isolated from the primary system during accidents, and other plant systems.  
Neutronic assumptions refer to what the initial and transient power distribution and 
magnitude are at steady state and shutdown conditions. The core neutronics and the 
coupled thermal hydraulic-neutronics work presented here, as well as in Huning (2014), 
and in Connolly et al. (2016), are focused on the computation of realistic steady state power 
and temperature distributions. The transient (shut-down) power distribution is assumed to 
be identical to the steady state distribution, since the heat that is generated is primarily due 
to the decay of fission products produced during normal operation. The total core heat 
generation rate is a function of time as the fission products decay. This specific function 
used for decay power is listed as a critical assumption.    
Thermo-fluid assumptions include those relating to the manner in which the solid 
material temperatures, and thermo-fluid parameters are computed for the selected 
components and structures.  
Table 3.4 describes the most critical assumptions used in the analysis of HTGR – 
LOFC accidents. Each successive assumption within each of the three sections is less 
important than the previous one. Therefore, Table 3.4 can also be used to aid in the 
selection of future improvements to the method developed here and the corresponding 





Table 3.4 List of Critical Assumptions 
Modeling decision assumptions 
No. Description Impact 
1 Model only convective heat transfer by 
the helium coolant in the riser channel 
between the vessel wall and core 
Higher predicted core temperatures 
since radiation and conduction across 
gap will aid in vessel heat removal 
2 Static D-LOFC containment –vessel 
equilibrium pressure of 1 MPa 
Containment volume modeling will 
allow for additional heat removal to 
containment gas   
3 RCCS heat removal as a function of  
outer vessel wall temperature 
Along with containment modeling, 
this would reduce the number of 
external calculations and models 
4 SCS or connected primary conversion  
system doesn’t interact with core helium 
Additional material (mass) would 
reduce core helium temperatures 
 
Neutronics assumptions 
5 No coupled fuel-depletion calculations  Initial power distributions are 
typically under-peaked compared to 
end-of-cycle distributions 
Standard (LWR) ANSI decay heat 
generation curves must be used 




6 1-D vessel volume models 3-D fluid modeling in the non-core, 
vessel volumes would yield a more 
accurate heat transfer estimate to the 
vessel wall and ultimately the RCCS 
7 Material properties are independent of 
radiation fluence 
Graphite density, thermal conductivity 
decreases as radiation exposure is 
increased  
8 Single component gas fluid Helium will not be 100% pure during 
normal operation 
Oxygen and water vapor can cause 
graphite oxidation which would alter 
the local heat transfer performance  
9 Fuel dimensions are  “as-
manufactured” 
During normal operation the fuel 
compacts will shrink, swell, and 
crack. This will lead to higher local 
peak temperatures 
10 Helium is an ideal gas with constant 
specific heats 
Over the temperature range of interest, 






 The importance of each assumption is assessed in Chapter 7. In particular, Table 
7.1 should be referred to when deciding the assumptions that must be refined for future 
work. The particular numerical assumptions, such as time-step size and discretization, are 
discussed in the next chapter, which discusses the numerical implementation of the 






4.  NUMERICAL APPROACH 
 This chapter describes the connections between the fluid model, the unit cell energy 
balance, and the other connected physical models such as the decay heat generation and 
RCCS heat removal over the course of the transient simulation. The specific time-steps are 
discussed for the fluid and solid unit cell models. Finally, since a cluster of processors are 
used to reduce the computational time, the specific Message Passing Interface algorithm is 
also discussed.  
4.1 Solid Node Time Integration 
The semi-implicit time integration scheme for the fluid method was discussed in 
Section 3.2. Different time-step sizes are used for the fluid calculations and the solid node 
calculations that are discussed in Section 4.2. The solid node (unit-cell) time integration 
scheme is discussed here in this section. This is because it is different than that used for the 
fluid calculations. This leads to the computation of different physical quantities at different 
intervals. The resolution of this computational mismatch is also discussed in this chapter.  
A fully explicit time integration scheme was previously used for the steady state 
unit cell calculations without the incorporation of the transient fluid model. This led to 
small time-step sizes (0.01 to 0.001s) to ensure numerical stability. However, for a transient 
simulation with time-dependent heat generation, as is the case for the LOFC accidents that 
assume a reactor trip from full power at t = 0, the numerically stable time-step size changes 
over time and could lead to non-physical simulations late in the transient computation. 
Therefore, a more stable time integration scheme is implemented to ensure numerical 
stability and decrease the overall computational time.  
The selected time integration technique for the unit cell energy balances is a Fourth-
Order Runge-Kutta (RK4) scheme. The unit cell energy balance equation (see Eq. 3.2) has 




respectively, where n is the current time and 1n +  is the new time. The RK4 method used 
here computes the new unit cell temperature using Eq. (4.1) through Eq. (4.5). 
[ ]1 1 2 3 41 6 2 2n nT T T T T T+ = + ⋅ ∆ + ⋅ ∆ + ⋅ ∆ + ∆                          Eq. (4.1) 
( )1 ,n nT t f t T∆ = ∆ ⋅                                           Eq. (4.2) 
( )2 12, 2n nT t f t t T T∆ = ∆ ⋅ + ∆ + ∆                             Eq. (4.3) 
( )3 22, 2n nT t f t t T T∆ = ∆ ⋅ + ∆ + ∆                             Eq. (4.4) 
( )4 4,n nT t f t t T T∆ = ∆ ⋅ + ∆ + ∆                                Eq. (4.5) 
The solution method consists of solving a fully explicit estimate of the new 
temperature distribution, 1T∆ , within the reactor core. Then, new whole core temperature 
distributions are computed for each successive 
i
T∆  estimate. Thus for each time-step, a 
minimum of five whole core temperature distributions are computed using Eq. (4.1) 
through Eq. (4.5) and stored in memory to determine the RK4 new temperature 
distribution, 1nT + . 
Since the RK4 method offers enhanced numerical stability over the explicit method, 
a longer time-step is used. The time-step size used for the unit-cell temperature calculations 
is ~0.5 s. This has been demonstrated for the MHTGR to be the longest stable time-step 
size over the entire LOFC simulations. One assumption used in the RK4 method described 
here is that convective heat transfer rates, which contribute to the functions, ( )...f , for 
graphite unit cells that contain a coolant channel, are constant over the time-step.  This is 
done to preserve heat addition to and heat removal from the helium and graphite 
respectively. This prevents having to re-compute or iterate between the solid unit cell 
computations and the fluid calculations over the time-step.  
Ideally, longer time-step sizes could be used for the solid node calculations if the 
convective heat transfer rates were updated as the RK4 method progressed. This would 




solid node calculations. It should be noted that the solid node time-step size was selected 
to be stable without the need for iteration in concert with the fluid method, which would 
be computationally prohibitive for whole-core calculations. The next section describes the 
computational process in more detail.  
4.2 Computational Process 
 There are principally two different time regimes operating in this method: (1) the 
unit-cell (solid graphite and fuel) heat conduction and energy balance time regime, and (2) 
the transient fluid time regime. Calculations for RCCS heat removal and heat generation 
rate also occur within one of the two regimes. Additionally, there are time-steps for data 
handling such as writing whole-core temperature distributions to output files. A general 
procedure illustrating the computational flow is shown in Figure 4.1.  
 
 The two different time regimes, transient fluid calculations and the unit-cell heat 
and energy balance calculations can be observed in Figure 4.1. The red line represents the 
time difference calculations for each regime. The blue lines represent convective heat 
transfer estimates over the time-step for use in the unit-cell energy balance calculations. 
The black lines represent new graphite surface temperature estimates for the transient fluid 
 




calculations. Finally, the dashed magenta lines represent the steps at which the output of 
the key thermal fluid parameters of interest is required. 
For the first time-step, the basic process is:  
(1) initialize all thermal fluid parameters including initial temperature and 
power distributions that are described in Section 3.2, 
(2) solve the transient fluid equations for multiple fluid time-steps ( flt∆ ) until 
the simulation time is greater than the unit-cell energy balance time-step 
 ( 0 hct t t> + ∆ ), 
(3) collect convective heat transfer rates over the fluid time-steps and transfer 
the time-averaged rates over 
hc
t∆ to the unit-cell heat and energy 
calculations, 
(4) compute the new whole-core graphite and fuel temperature distributions,  
(5) transfer the new time fluid node graphite surface temperatures back to the 
transient fluid calculations, 
(6) continue steps (2) through (5) until some output time-step (∆tout) has passed 
and then write output files, 
(7) continue steps (2) through (6) until the final simulation time (
end
t ) has 
passed and then finalize the simulation.  
RCCS heat removal is estimated and applied to the fluid riser channel during step (2). 
Decay heat generation is estimated and applied to the fuel heat transfer calculations during 
step (4).  
The time-step sizes are carefully chosen so that unit-cell energy balance 
calculations always occur at the end/beginning of a new fluid time-step. Similarly, the 
output time-steps are carefully chosen so that they coincide with the end/beginning of a 
new unit-cell energy balance time-step. Thus, the number of fluid time-steps per unit-cell 




If overlapping time-steps were used, incorrect or poorly estimated values could be reported. 
This also allows for a repeatable or fixed data communication structure between processors 
for high performance computing application.  
4.3 High Performance Computing Implementation 
 To reduce the computational time associated with the numerical approach discussed 
in the previous section, domain decomposition is used to parallelize the unit-cell energy 
balance and fluid calculations. For the unit-cell calculations, the core is decomposed at the 
assembly block level. This is chosen because during each time-step, the heat conduction 
and energy balance calculations are primarily self-contained within each assembly. For the 
transient fluid calculations, each core coolant channel is treated independently (assuming 
no core cross-flow), which allows for a simple equal parsing of coolant channels between 
the available processors. The remaining fluid volumes such as the upper plenum, riser, and 
lower plenum are treated by a single processor.  
 Parallelization is achieved through the use of MPI and a Linux server cluster of 
anywhere between 8 and 128 processors. The optimal number of processors used for 
parallelization is dependent on a number of different factors including: the number of tasks 
that can be performed in parallel, and the communication cost for each processor added. 
For the unit-cell calculations, the number of parallel tasks is proportional to the number of 
active fuel assemblies (66 for the MHTGR). This is due to domain decomposition at the 
assembly level. This was chosen because only a limited amount of information about the 
eight neighboring assemblies (six radial and two axial) is needed. The reflector block 
assemblies do not contain any fuel or coolant channels and their temperature distribution 
can be computed much faster than for the active fuel assemblies. This implies that the 
optimal number of processors should be around 66 for the MHTGR. However, with 




A diagram of the communication scheme for a single unit-cell energy balance time-
step is shown in Figure 4.2. For illustration purposes, four processors are assumed. Node 
0 is referred to as the “host node” since it computes the MPI parameters and controls the 
simulation process. Nodes 1 through 3 are referred to as “work nodes” since they are 
responsible for the bulk of the computations. The process numbers associated with Figure 








 The communication and computation boxes shown in Figure 4.2 are exaggerated 
to clearly show the communication processes. The chosen time-steps, unit-cell, and fluid 
node discretizations yield about equal computational demand between the fluid 
calculations (“A” steps) and the unit-cell energy balance calculations (“B” steps).  
Typical calculation times for MHTGR P-LOFC simulations are around 146 hours 
for 16-24 processors. For the D-LOFC simulations, the total computational time is around 
220 hours. For 18 processors, the computational speedup over a single processor is a factor 
of 7.8. This is due to the added communication time associated with distributed memory, 
parallel algorithms. Additional processors add communication work and ultimately, 
speedup decreases.  
Table 4.1. Process Number Descriptions for Figure 4.2 
Process # Description 
A.1 For the current time, 
n
t , the “host” node sends the graphite 
surface temperatures for each fluid node to each “work” 
processor 
A.2 Each “work” node computes the explicit and half step fluid 
quantities for each assigned fluid node and then sends this 
data back to the “host” node 
A.3 The “host” proc. computes the hybrid pressure distribution, 
and the updated, new time-step quantities 
A.4 The next fluid time-step is advanced and the new fluid values 
are passed back each “work” node 
B.1 After all the fluid time-steps within a unit-cell energy balance 
time-step are complete, the average convective heat transfer 
rate over 
hc
t∆ is passed to each “work” node 
B.2 For each graphite and fuel compact unit-cell, 1T∆  given in Eq. 
(4.2) is computed and passed back to the “host” node 
B.3 For each graphite and fuel compact unit-cell, 2T∆  given in 




Not shown on Figure 4.2. Similar to B.2 and B.3, 3T∆  and 
4T∆ are computed and passed back to the “host” node. The 
“host” node then computes the new time-step temperature 
distribution from Eq. (4.1). The process then repeats with the 





 Normally, the computational time could be reduced by increasing the mesh size or 
lengthening the time-step size. In practice however, the chosen time-step size is fixed to be 
the largest numerically stable value, which is determined by a set of trail-and-error 
simulations. These preliminary stability simulations have clear outputs indicating whether 
the numerical results are stable or not. As soon as the method becomes unstable at some 
location within the core, the non-physical numerical results quickly propagate throughout 
the rest of the core and vessel. If the fluid model is not stable, it leads to errors in both the 
pressure drop and heat transfer coefficient calculations. This in turn leads to solid node 
energy balance errors. If the solid unit cell model is not stable, then non-physical new core 
temperatures are quickly observed. For all of the present results, the simulations are stable 
at all core locations over the entire transient.  
For the present method, the mesh size for the prismatic HTGR and the associated 
fuel assemblies is also fixed, for the most part, due to the original choice of the unit cell to 
be containing either a single fuel pin or coolant channel. There is some choice regarding 
the axial height of the fluid channels and solid nodes. However, this also was chosen to 
reflect the physical height of the fuel assemblies and the height used in the neutronics 
calculations. Thus, the only substantial or practical option for reducing the computational 
time is by improving the high performance computing aspects. 
 Several improvements could be made to reduce the total computational demand. 
The first is to parallelize the A.3 step in Table 4.1. This would require implementing a 
linear equation solver parallel algorithm for the hybrid pressure distribution and then 
passing the hybrid pressure back to the “work” nodes. The “work” nodes could then 
compute all the new updated fluid variables and thermodynamic quantities and pass these 
data back to the “host” node. Another improvement would be to group core coolant 
channels by assemblies and keep the computed new fluid parameters local to that 
processor, which would then compute the unit-cell energy balance rates using those new 




5.  ACCIDENT SCENARIO RESULTS 
This chapter presents the results for the two principal design basis accidents for the 
HTGR using the physical method and numerical approach outlined in the two previous 
chapters. The two principal design basis accidents include the pressurized loss-of-forced 
circulation (P-LOFC) and the depressurized loss-of-forced-circulation (D-LOFC) 
accidents. The primary difference between the two is that the P-LOFC is maintained around 
the normal operating pressure of 6.39 MPa and the D-LOFC accident is assumed to reach 
equilibrium with the containment around 1.0 MPa. 
The initial conditions for each accident are the same, with the exception of the 
pressure condition. The initial temperature and power distributions are described in Section 
3.2. The power distribution over the transient is constant; however, the magnitude drops as 
decay power decreases. The decay power decrease is assumed to be similar to the ANSI 
low enriched UO2 decay heat curve for LWRs. The neutron energy spectrum is expected 
to be slightly different for the prismatic HTGR than for an LWR, leading to a slightly 
different fission product, and decay power magnitude. These neutronic effects are not 
expected to significantly alter the decay power over time for the MHTGR. 
The decision to analyze LOFC accidents in this work over other accidents such as 
air or water ingress was based on the available research, which is discussed in more detail 
in Chapter 2. Additionally, the LOFC accidents are fundamental to all other accident 
categories. For example, air-ingress accidents progress in similar fashion to the D-LOFC, 
with the exception of possible graphite oxidation reactions. Similarly, water-ingress or 
other positive reactive insertion accidents follow the same D-LOFC progression until 
recriticality occurs which is typically much later in the accident, when core temperatures 
have cooled to some low temperature. The most limiting accidents are then dependent on 




It will be shown in the following sections that the RCCS plays a vital role for the 
LOFC accidents since it is the only system available to remove decay heat. It is assumed 
that for sufficiently elevated vessel temperatures, the RCCS is able to remove a certain 
amount of heat directly from the vessel according to the model outlined in Section 3.4. One 
important assumption to note is that below 230oC, the RCCS does not remove any heat 
from the vessel. This a conservative assumption but it should not be too conservative since 
the helium density at 230oC is only 25% lower than the density at 100oC and 1 MPa, which 
is the primary driving mechanism for natural recirculation. For a water-cooled RCCS, the 
minimum vessel wall temperature is expected to be just above 100oC for low heat removal 
rates.  
It should also be noted that during normal operation, the flow direction is downward 
through the core. Helium enters the vessel through a lower elevation cross-duct. It then 
travels upward through a riser channel, down through the core into the lower plenum, then 
out of the vessel through the inner double tube cross-duct. During an LOFC accident, the 
PCU is assumed to isolate (a main shutoff valve closes on loss of power), and a lower 
plenum valve opens connecting the lower plenum to the riser channel. This lower plenum 
valve can either be electronically controlled, which would fail open on loss-of-power, or it 
could fail open due to the loss of pressure difference between the inlet helium and the outlet 
helium. During normal operation, the outlet helium will be about 30-40 kPa lower than the 
inlet helium. During an LOFC when natural circulation is occurring, the core helium 
pressure drop will be much less than this, around 1 kPa for a P-LOFC, and 0.16 kPa for a 
D-LOFC. This pressure drop is balanced by the gravitational head difference along the 
vessel wall and in the core. Since helium is a low-density gas, the temperature difference 
needed to produce this gravitational head difference could result in peak fuel temperatures 
being exceeded. Core temperature results for both LOFC cases are presented and discussed 




It should be noted that the purpose of the LOFC results for the MHTGR-350 
presented here is not to certify the safety of the MHTGR-350 for immediate licensing but 
rather to highlight the importance of accurate fuel assembly and whole core modeling. 
Several aspects of this method should be improved to further increase the accuracy of the 
calculations prior to submitting a proposed safety design basis to regulatory agencies. 
Future work and possible improvements to the method are discussed in Chapter 7. 
Discussions of the LOFC results follow.  
 5.1 P-LOFC Results 
The P-LOFC simulation was terminated after 48 hours once both core and peak and 
average temperatures began to decrease over time. Core peak and average temperatures 
over time are plotted in Figure 5.1. 
 
 The transient can be separated into three separate phases: (1) initial cool-down, (2) 
core heat-up, and (3) safe shutdown phase. The initial cool-down occurs starting when the 
control rods insert at t = 0, which causes the core power to quickly decrease to a fraction 
of the normal operating power (< 5%). This in-turn causes the temperature gradient 
 




between the local graphite and fuel compact to dramatically decrease. Temperature 
gradients within the fuel assemblies decrease accordingly. Additionally, during this phase, 
heat is redistributed from high temperature regions of the core to lower temperature 
regions. The initial cool-down phase lasts approximately from t = 0 to t = 1 hr. The P-









 The flow direction arrow in Figure 5.2 is now opposite to that at steady state. During 
an LOFC transient, the flow reverses direction due to buoyancy forces. The core heats up 
the helium causing it to rise. The vessel wall then cools the helium causing it to fall in the 
direction of the natural circulation flow. The peak fuel temperature at this time is around 
550oC.  
Once a new thermal equilibrium is reached for the new power level, the core heat-
up phase begins. This is due an energy mismatch between core heat removal and heat 
generation. Figure 5.3 shows the energy balance over time for the P-LOFC.  
 
 The core heat-up phase for the P-LOFC accident lasts approximately from t = 1 hr 
to t = 20 hrs. This is observed in Figure 5.3 when heat generation rate is greater than the 
vessel heat removal rate. The vessel heat removal rate surpasses the heat generation rate at 
about t = 16 hrs. However, even when the vessel heat removal rate is greater than the heat 
generation rate, average core temperatures still rise slightly until t = 20 hrs. This lag is 
primarily associated to stored heat removal in the helium and the vessel wall.  
 Additionally, peak fuel temperatures do not reach a maximum until slightly later, 
i.e., at around t = 30 hrs. This is due to different heat generation rates at different core 
 




locations. This time-dependent, spatially dependent phenomenon does not contribute 
significantly to peak fuel temperature rise as the peak fuel temperature at t = 30 hrs is only 
12oC hotter than at t = 20 hrs. The fuel temperature distribution at the end of the core heat-
up phase is shown in Figure 5.4. 
 
 The fuel temperature is peaked toward the top due to the coolant entering the 
bottom of the core and exiting at the top of the core. This is in contrast to normal operation 
for which the opposite trend is observed. It is at this time the core can begin to cool-down 
because sufficient recirculation has been established. The peak core coolant flow rate 
 





during the P-LOFC is 4 kg/s. This is in comparison to the normal operation flow rate of 
151 kg/s. Once the core begins to cool-down from the distribution shown in Figure 5.4, the 
core mass flow rate decreases due to decreasing fluid temperature difference between the 
upper and lower plenums. This leads into the safe shut-down phase since peak fuel 
temperatures have not exceeded their design failure limit (1600oC) and will only decrease 
beyond this time due to decreasing heat generation rate. The final fuel temperature 
distribution for the P-LOFC accident is shown in Figure 5.5. 
 
 





Although the temperature distribution shown in Figure 5.5 does not appear to be 
dramatically different than the distribution shown in Figure 5.4, it is clear that the lowest 
elevation axial slice is cooler than the lowest axial slice in Figure 5.4. Similarly, the highest 
elevation axial slice is also slightly cooler. This indicates that the core is in-fact cooling 
down to a safe and stable configuration without the need for any operator action or external 
electrical power source.  
 5.2 D-LOFC Results 
 The D-LOFC simulation was terminated after 60 hours once peak and average core 
temperatures begin to decrease over time. Core peak and average temperatures over time 
are plotted in Figure 5.6. 
 
There is an immediate difference between the D-LOFC simulation and P-LOFC 
simulation results presented in Figure 5.1. The temperatures for the D-LOFC are 
significantly higher than for the P-LOFC. However, there are still three distinct phases 
similar to the case for the P-LOFC. These phases are: the (1) initial cool-down, (2) core 
heat-up, and (3) safe shutdown phase.  
 




Similar to the P-LOFC, the initial cool down extends from t = 0 to about t = 0.75 
hr. This occurs because the insertion of the control rods drops the normal operation power 
of 350 MW to only a few megawatts over the course of a few minutes. It is slightly shorter 
for the D-LOFC than for the P-LOFC because the helium density is significantly lower, 
which prevents helium recirculation that aids in the redistribution of heat from the lower 
portion of the core to the upper, cooler regions. Since this redistribution does not occur, the 
heat-up phase begins earlier. The fuel temperature distribution at the end of the initial cool-





 The initial cool-down fuel temperature distribution shown in Figure 5.7 is only 
slightly cooler than the initial temperature distribution shown in Figure 3.5. This is because 
the core power decreases significantly and some heat is redistributed into the inner and 
outer reflector blocks. During this phase, there is no helium recirculation. Figure 5.8 shows 
the overall D-LOFC energy balance.   
 
 






 The core heat-up phase for the D-LOFC extends much longer than for the P-LOFC 
case. This is expected since recirculation and heat removal are much lower; therefore, more 
time is needed to reduce the heat generation. At about 20 hours, there is nearly zero vessel 
heat removal. This is due to no core recirculation during this time preventing the core high 
temperature helium from contacting the vessel wall. Stagnant, low temperature helium rests 
between the core and the vessel wall preventing vessel heat removal. It is only after the 
core heats up significantly that the helium density gradient is sufficient to drive some small 
core flow allowing for the vessel wall to heat up.  
The core heat-up phase lasts from about t = 0.75 hrs to about t = 33 hrs. This is 
observed in Figure 5.8 when vessel heat removal becomes larger than heat generation. For 
the P-LOFC case, the core heat-up phase is defined as the time from when the core average 
temperature is at a minimum post-SCRAM to the time for which the fuel temperature 
reaches a maximum. If a similar definition is used for the D-LOFC case, the fuel 
temperature reaches a maximum around t = 21 hrs. However, the average temperatures are 
still increasing at this point and do not begin to drop until t = 33 hrs, when the heat removal 
becomes greater than the heat generation.  
 




 This leads to a regulatory safety question of which parameter to use as the definition 
for core heat-up and when safe shut-down is reached. For LWRs, the classification of safe 
shut-down or “safe-and-stable” configuration has certain reactor operator implications, 
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commision (2009). It is advantageous from a reactor operator 
perspective to have the core in a safe shut-down configuration as soon as possible. Taking 
the most conservative approach for LOFC accidents, safe shut-down is defined as the time 
when both the peak and average fuel temperatures begin to decrease.  
 On the one hand, if peak fuel temperatures begin to decrease and fuel failure limits 
have not been exceeded, it is very unlikely that peak fuel temperatures could exceed fuel 
failure limits later in the accident. However, if average temperatures are still increasing, it 
may not be immediately clear if the RCCS would be able to remove decay heat indefinitely. 
Therefore, it is the best safety decision to define safe shut-down as the time when both peak 
and average fuel temperatures are decreasing.  
 A more important question may be, “For the D-LOFC, why does the peak fuel 
temperature decrease before the average temperature?” This is in contrast to the P-LOFC 
accident for which the peak fuel temperature was not observed to decrease until a few hours 
after the average temperatures began to decrease. This was due to a thermal lag associated 
with the cooling of the graphite along the coolant channels, which was not observed in the 
fuel until later. This question is answered upon investigation of the channel mass flow rates 
between the P- and D-LOFC accidents.  
For the P-LOFC case, the channel mass flow rates are nearly uniform with a total 
core flow rate between 2 – 4 kg/s. For the D-LOFC accident, channel mass flow rates are 
negligible for times less than t = 20 hrs due to the lack of sufficient density gradient for 
natural circulation. This is ultimately due to the reduced vessel pressure associated with 
the primary system break, which does not occur for the P-LOFC case.  After this time, a 
very small recirculation flow begins to develop. The total core flow rate after t = 20 hrs is 




through the core. Peak fuel temperatures are initially located at the base of the core. As the 
lower portion of the core cools, the upper portions begin to heat-up and a reverse axial 
temperature profile develops. As this axial redistribution of heat due to late recirculation 
flow forms, the peak fuel temperature is fluctuating based on the core location. The overall 
trend of the peak fuel temperature is decreasing during this time primarily due to the lower 
core power density in the upper portions of the core.   
 Another important question is: “Why is there negligible vessel heat removal prior 
to t=20 hrs?”  This is principally due to two factors: (1) thermal modeling within the riser 
channel and between the core barrel is limited to convective heat transfer (due to 
recirculation if any), and (2) there is no recirculation flow prior to t = 20 hrs. The first factor 
is a conservative assumption since there will be some heat conduction across the riser 
channel as well as radiation heat transfer. Without knowing the specific vessel geometry 
beyond the core region, it is unclear how much conduction or radiation occurs within this 
region. Without coolant flow through the riser channel, the vessel wall stays near its initial 
temperature and thus no heat is removed by the RCCS. This is an important area of 
improvement for future HTGR LOFC accident modeling as there will be some additional 






 In Figure 5.9, peak fuel temperatures are observed in the third and fourth axial slice 
from the bottom of the core. This corresponds to the same location as the peak power 
density as shown in Figure 3.4. Therefore, it can be concluded that the initial power 
distribution does play a role during the LOFC accident after reactor SCRAM has occurred. 
After this time, core recirculation, although very small (~0.4 kg/s), begins to slowly carry 
heat away from the lower portion of the core to the upper portions. This is physically 
observed in the fuel as a peak temperature wave traveling upward through the core. This 
 
Figure 5.9 D-LOFC Fuel Temperature Distribution at the Time when Fuel 




wave gradually decreases in magnitude since the power density is lower in the upper 
regions of the core.  
 Once the peak fuel temperatures reach the top of the vessel and vessel heat removal 
rate outpaces heat generation, the safe shut-down or cooldown phase begins. This occurs 
at approximately t = 33 hrs. The final fuel temperature during the safe shut-down phase is 
shown in Figure 5.10. 
 
 From Figure 5.10, the bottom of the core is much cooler than in Figure 5.9. This is 
due to cooler helium entering the base of the core after being cooled by the vessel wall, 
 





which is cooled by the RCCS. For later times, heat generation will continue to decrease, 
and RCCS heat removal remains fairly constant at around 2.1 MW. This leads to decreasing 
fuel and graphite temperatures beyond t = 33 hrs.  
 While fuel failure is not predicted for either the P-LOFC or D-LOFC case, fuel 
temperatures could exceed 1600oC for some of the more extreme D-LOFC cases with 
containment failure. This would lead to a loss of the 1 MPa back-pressure assumed in these 
analyses. However, several improvements could be made to increase the safety margin for 
HTGRs. Since natural circulation is dependent on the height between the cooler helium 
along the vessel wall and the hot helium in the core region, it would be beneficial to 
increase the vessel height above the core region. Currently, there is an upper reflector (0.79 
m) above the core, as well as the upper plenum. Adding another reflector (total 1.58 m) to 
the top of the core would increase the graphite mass available to absorb heat during an 
accident, as well as add natural circulation height.  
 However, it is unlikely that any safety improvement could be made without some 
economic trade-off. Considering that the economic cost of a nuclear plant is closely tied to 
the cost of the vessel diameter, it would ultimately be cheaper to increase the vessel height 
than to add to the core radial dimensions (i.e., have a lower power density). This 
optimization and economic trade-off should be considered for future HTGR design efforts 





6. RELAP5-3D COMPARISON RESULTS 
The previous chapter presented results using the transient HTGR thermal-fluid 
analysis method developed in the present study to compute core temperature distributions 
for the P-LOFC and D-LOFC accident simulations.  This chapter presents results for the 
same reactor design and accident scenarios using the fuel models available within the 
RELAP5-3D computer code. RELAP is used extensively in the LWR nuclear industry for 
its high reliability, accuracy, and availability. RELAP has also been used for some select 
HTGR studies such as the NGNP point design (MacDonald 2003). The typical fuel models 
used in RELAP are investigated for HTGRs in this Chapter.  
The purpose of performing these HTGR RELAP simulations is primarily to 
highlight the differences associated with the fuel models available in RELAP to those 
previously described using the approach developed here in Chapter 3. These differences 
lead to critically different transient results for the P- and D-LOFC accidents. The RELAP 
simulation results presented here demonstrate the need for a transient method capable of 
whole-core level modeling with pin-level resolution and an accurate power distribution.   
The same vessel geometry and initial fluid conditions assumed in the previous 
Chapters are also used for the RELAP analyses presented here. The next section discusses 
the discretization of the core and fuel assemblies. 
6.1 RELAP MHTGR Fuel Model 
Two principal fuel models are investigated. The first is a typical LWR fuel model 
that considers the fuel, cladding and surrounding moderator to be concentric cylinders with 
a convective heat transfer outer radius boundary condition and a symmetric temperature 
boundary condition at r = 0. For non-concentric cylinder fuel geometry, this model is often 
called an “Equivalent Cylindrical Model”, Todreas and Kazimi (2001), because the fuel 




radii computed from a mass balance between the physical and model geometry. For the 
HTGR, the order of the fuel, graphite and helium as equivalent cylinders is not immediately 
intuitive. A representation of this model for the HTGR is shown in Figure 6.1. 
 
There is also a small gap (helium) space between the fuel compact and graphite in 
both the HTGR fuel assembly and the RELAP Model. The coolant in the RELAP model is 
not physically contained in the fuel heat structure (RELAP fuel model) but is in a defined 
hydrodynamic volume connected to the heat structure. The fuel diameter in the RELAP 
model has been greatly exaggerated for illustration purposes in Figure 6.1. The mass of 
both the fuel and graphite have been conserved between the HTGR fuel assembly and the 
RELAP model. 
There are several obvious drawbacks to this model. The first is that because the 
radii are determined from conserving the mass, the thermal resistance of the graphite 
between the fuel and coolant may be significantly overestimated due to all of the graphite 
in the HTGR fuel assembly being placed between the fuel and coolant. This enlarged 
resistance also causes the transient response in the fuel due to changing coolant conditions 
to be delayed or slowed. The second drawback is that only a single fuel compact is modeled 
for an entire assembly. There are approximately 210 fuel compacts per assembly, each with 
 




their own power density. To ensure that the same core power is used for the RELAP model 
and the assembly, this leads to only a fuel compact with an average power density being 
modeled. This can be slightly mitigated by modeling several assemblies as equivalent 
cylinders with each fuel cylinder having a different assembly power. However, this still 
limits any intra-assembly power peaking, which leads to lower predicted peak fuel 
temperatures. Another drawback is that this model does not allow for bypass gap heat 
removal from the assembly. Only a single hydrodynamic volume can be coupled to the 
equivalent cylinder model. From previous steady state calculations, it is expected that 
bypass gap heat removal could account for as much as 10% of the total core heat removal. 
Without this heat removal, helium temperatures could be slightly overestimated, leading to 
an overestimation of the graphite temperature and subsequent fuel temperature. If the 
bypass gaps are neglected all together, core flow rates will be higher than predicted, leading 
to an underestimation of graphite temperature. 
Due to these complications associated with the equivalent cylinder model for 
HTGR fuel, a new fuel model that alleviates some of these concerns was constructed for 
the HTGR. The new model uses 2-D slabs (x-z geometry) to represent the graphite, fuel, 
and gap space. This also allows for bypass flow to contribute to core heat removal. The 
hydrodynamic volumes can remain in their particular geometry: circular tubes for assembly 
coolant channels, and flat bypass flow channels. This new model allows for some intra-
assembly power peaking to be simulated. Although not every fuel compact can be modeled, 
which is possible with the method developed in this study, this new model can compute up 






Two heat structures are shown in Figure 6.2. However, along the fuel assembly 
diagonal shown in red, there are four heat structures containing a total of seven fuel 
compacts and space for four hydrodynamic volumes. Each heat structure is bounded by 
two hydrodynamic volumes except for the inner surface of the inner most slab. This surface 
is an insulated or symmetric boundary condition. When all four of these heat structures are 
lined up, the resulting fuel assembly model looks similar to that shown in Figure 6.3. 
 
 
Figure 6.2 Advanced Slab Fuel RELAP Model 
 




This fuel model is used to represent three different assemblies within the core. Each 
fuel assembly is for a different active fuel assembly ring around the core. The three heat 
structure (HS) numbers and hydrodynamic (HY) numbers are for each of these fuel 
assemblies. Additionally, the fuel heat structures and core coolant hydrodynamic volumes 
are axially divided into ten segments. Within each assembly heat structure, the fuel and 
graphite volumes are further discretized into three to seven different sub-slabs. This leads 
to a total of 210 fuel compacts modeled with 630 unique fuel temperature points. 
Unlike the equivalent cylinder model, which only has one flexible dimension 
(radius), the slab fuel model has two (width and length). The height for each model is fixed 
at the active core height of the MHTGR, which is 7.93 m. Figure 6.3 shows the width of 
each fuel or graphite slab to be the same, but the length of each heat structure decreases as 
the slabs move inward. The slab length is fixed to conserve fuel and graphite mass between 
the physical assembly and the model. This allows for the slab width to be set relative to its 
actual dimensions within the hexagonal assembly block. For example, the cylindrical fuel 
compact diameter is 12.45 mm. The equivalent slab width for a similar thermal resistance 
is 5.9 mm. The graphite slab width used is an approximate average distance between the 
fuel and coolant channel.  
For the inner and outer core reflector blocks, these are approximated as similar slabs 
to the fuel model but only contain one graphite volume. Bypass flow hydrodynamic 
volumes connect to each reflector slab face. 
One drawback common to both the advanced slab fuel model and the equivalent 
cylinder mode is that heat transfer between assembly blocks is limited. No heat conduction 
can occur between the inner assembly ring heat structures (HS 1124) and the outer ones 
(HS 1144 and HS 1174). On a similar note, no heat conduction can occur into the inner and 
outer reflector blocks. This large mass of graphite is needed during an LOFC to absorb heat 




and mixing in the lower and upper plenum vessel regions. The specific MHTGR fluid 
nodalization is discussed in the next section. 
Finally, the power distribution assumed is the same as what is used for the LOFC 
analyses presented in the previous chapter (see Figure 3.4). Since less fuel compacts are 
modeled in RELAP, some pin-power averaging is required to maintain a constant power 
level. The averaging procedure is as follows: (1) compute the total power for each fuel ring 
and axial location from Figure 3.4, (2) compute the fuel mass fraction for each fuel ring 
and axial location, (3) within each fuel ring and axial location, compute the fuel mass 
fraction for each heat structure (e.g., for the inner-most fuel ring, 26% of the fuel is in HS 
1124, 43% in 1125, 25% in 1127 and 6% in 1128), (4) apply these heat structure specific 
fractions to the total power for that particular fuel ring and axial location, and finally (5) 
verify that the total core power sums to the design power (i.e., 350 MW). See Appendix B 
for the specific power factors used for each heat structure. 
6.2 Fluid Nodalization  
A diagram of the fluid nodalization used for the MHTGR LOFC simulations is 





The core region shown in Figure 6.4 consists of the fuel and graphite heat structures 
described in the previous section. It also contains the appropriate hydrodynamic volumes 
linked to those heat structures. For each hydrodynamic volume, there is an adjoining inlet 
and outlet junction. Each hydrodynamic volume within the core also consists of 10 
different axial nodes to match the axial discretization of the heat structures.  
 




With the exception of the core region and coolant riser channels, all other fluid 
volumes are classified as “single volumes” within RELAP. The core region and the coolant 
riser channels are “pipe volumes”. The coolant riser channel is also discretized into 10 axial 
segments to improve the RCCS heat removal calculations.  
Heat removal from the vessel wall to the RCCS is modeled as a convective 
boundary condition on the outer vessel wall heat structure (HS 1150 in Figure 6.4). The 
convective heat transfer coefficient is supplied by a look-up table for specific vessel wall 
temperatures. The specific value for this heat transfer coefficient is identical to the RCCS 
performance curve shown in Figure 3.9.  
Fluid volumes 101 and 140 in Figure 6.4 represent large boundary volumes not 
critical to the transient simulation. These volumes, along with the time-dependent junction 
and valve 131 and 102 respectively, control whether normal operating (steady state) 
boundary conditions exist or if a LOFC occurs. LOFC is only set to occur once a steady 
state temperature distribution within the core is formed. At this point, the mass flow rate 
through these junctions is set to zero for the P-LOFC case, or set to a specific down-stream 
pressure for the D-LOFC. Additionally, the junction connecting the lower plenum and the 
riser channels (131 in Figure 6.4) is normally closed but opens once the LOFC occurs.  
Although the Shut-down Cooling System (SCS) is present in the developed RELAP 
model, it is not used and/or is assumed to have failed for the LOFC accidents.  
Material properties for steel, graphite, and fuel-compact are supplied by user tables 
and are the same for those used in the method presented in the previous chapter. A complete 
listing of the material property values can be found in Appendix A.  
6.3 RELAP P-LOFC Simulation Results 
The basic approach for both the P-LOFC and D-LOFC simulations is to initialize 
the fuel and core materials to the inlet helium temperature (259oC), and let the core 




state is reached 20,000 s into the simulation. The steady state fuel temperature distribution 
is shown in Figure 6.5. 
 
Since RELAP cannot model every fuel compact, power averaging leads to under 
predicted steady state fuel temperatures compared to the temperature profile in Figure 3.5. 
The peak steady state fuel temperature here is around 810oC compared to the results 
presented earlier, which estimated the peak steady state fuel temperature to be near 950oC.  
After 20,000 s, the LOFC is initiated by reducing core powers according to the 
decay heat curve, isolating the vessel from the power conversion system, and opening the 
lower plenum recirculation valve. Similar to Figure 5.3, the transient energy balance for 
the RELAP P-LOFC simulation is shown in Figure 6.6. 
 





 The key difference in Figure 6.6 compared to the P-LOFC results presented earlier 
in Figure 5.3, is that vessel heat removal by the RCCS is stronger. This is due to higher 
vessel surface temperatures, which are caused by a slightly higher estimated natural 
recirculation flow rate. This occurs due to two key factors: (1) the friction factor values in 
RELAP are based on smooth tubes, and (2) the elevation difference is slightly larger in the 
RELAP model due to the inclusion of the lower elevation SCS volume. While the SCS is 
not assumed to be operational, helium flow still occurs through this volume as no valves 
or junctions exist to limit the flow. These factors both reduce the pressure drop due to 
friction and increase the gravitational fluid flow potential. It is clear that for future LOFC 
calculations, additional care must be given to the specific correlation choice for each 
individual volume and how/which volumes are selected to be included in the vessel model.  
 Because of the increased RCCS heat removal, peak and average fuel temperatures 
are lower. These temperatures are plotted in Figure 6.7.  
 





As shown in Figure 6.7, the heat-up phase is much shorter (between 5 – 6 hours) 
compared to earlier estimates (16 – 20 hours). Figure 6.8 shows the 3-D temperature 
distribution at the end of the core heat-up phase. 
 





Although peak and average fuel temperature still appear to be under predicted as 
compared to previous P-LOFC results, a general transient temperature trend similar to that 
observed for the whole core simulation is seen here also. Reverse flow through the reactor 
core removes heat from lower portions to higher core elevations. During this core heat-up 
phase, helium is continuously removing heat from lower elevations and depositing it at 
higher elevations until the top of the core reaches a maximum. When this occurs and fuel 
temperatures have not exceeded their failure temperature (1600oC), the cool-down or safe-
shutdown phase of the transient begins. Figure 6.9 shows the fuel temperature distribution 
during the safe-shutdown phase. 
 
Figure 6.8 RELAP P-LOFC Fuel Temperature Distribution at the End of the 





From Figures 6.6 through 6.9, it is clear that for the presented fuel and MHTGR 
models, fuel temperatures are well below any failure or safety thresholds. This is expected 
for the P-LOFC simulation since helium recirculation is strong at elevated pressures. It 
should be noted however that there are several aspects inherent to any RELAP fuel 
assembly model that may contribute to the under-prediction of fuel temperatures. These 
primarily include: (1) modeling a limited number of fuel pins by averaging pin-powers to 
conserve total core power, and (2) the neglecting of core-level heat transfer effects such as 
inter-assembly heat conduction across bypass gaps. While for the P-LOFC simulation this 
is not as dire, the D-LOFC simulation may require or demand a different core transient tool 
than RELAP. Results for the D-LOFC simulation using the presented RELAP model are 
discussed in the next section. 
 





6.4 RELAP D-LOFC Simulation Results 
 Similar to the P-LOFC simulation, the same steady state temperature distribution 
is reached at 20,000 s. All of the other transient and model parameters are the same for D-
LOFC except that a break junction and volume are introduced. A large break area is 
introduced on the cross-duct. The break area/size, orientation, and location are not as 
important for HTGRs as they are for LWRs. For LWRs, these parameters will determine 
how much coolant is lost and the time to fuel failure can vary significantly. For the HTGR, 
pressure reaches equilibrium with the containment volume quickly. Containment design 
will be critical for the HTGR to maintain as much pressure as possible in the vessel.  
 The LOFC accident initiates in the same manner as for the P-LOFC with exception 
of a break and break volume held at a constant pressure (1 MPa). Figure 6.10 shows the 
energy balance over time for the D-LOFC. 
 
 One key difference between the RELAP results in Figure 6.10 and those presented 
in Figure 5.8 is that the time required for the RCCS heat removal to surpass heat generation 
is much longer, i.e., 108 hrs. This is principally due to the lack of adequate heat 
  




redistribution into large inner and outer reflector block regions. This is different for the 
RELAP P-LOFC simulation because in that scenario, there is enough recirculation and 
mixing in the upper and lower plenums to distribute heat quickly. For the D-LOFC 
scenario, there is minimal recirculation. In reality, heat will be redistributed into these 
reflector block regions due to heat conduction across gap spaces which is absent in the 
RELAP fuel models. As the core heats-up, some minor recirculation flow develops and 
heat is slowly redistributed into the upper core region. Figure 6.11 shows the core 
temperature over time. 
 
From Figure 6.10 and 6.11, it can be seen that the core heat-up phase lasts until 
about t = 108 hrs. Peak temperatures gradually level off as some recirculation begins to 
develop within the vessel. Average graphite temperatures remain low because the inner 
and outer graphite reflector blocks do not absorb core heat as expected. Graphite 
temperatures in the active core region are near the average fuel temperature shown in 
Figure 6.11. For reasons similar to those discussed for the P-LOFC RELAP simulation, 
peak fuel temperatures do not appear to approach any fuel failure temperature limit. Fuel 
  





temperatures at the end of the core heat-up phase for the D-LOFC are shown in Figure 
6.12. 
 
After the core heat-up phase, the vessel heat removal out-paces the heat generation. 
Consequently, the average fuel and graphite temperatures begin to decrease from those 
observed in Figure 6.12. Figure 6.13 shows the late-term D-LOFC fuel temperature 
distribution during the safe shut-down phase. 
 
Figure 6.12 RELAP D-LOFC Fuel Temperature Distribution at the End of the 





 While the RELAP D-LOFC results appear acceptable from a safety standpoint, 
there are concerns about the RELAP fuel modeling capabilities for HTGRs. Some of these 
concerns have been discussed throughout this chapter. A list of these shortcomings and 















Table 6.1. RELAP HTGR, LOFC Modeling Concerns 
# Description  Importance* 
1. 
Limited number of fuel heat structures, requires pin-
power averaging, leads to lower peak fuel temperatures 
High 
2. 
Heat transfer coupling between assembly blocks at the 
core-level is difficult to adequately capture, leads to 
non-physical heat isolation within active fuel 
assemblies, can contribute to overly long transients 
High 
3. 
Accurate core power distribution is needed prior to any 
averaging, to compute peak fuel temperatures 
Medium 
4. 
Due to low gravitational flow potential during a D-
LOFC, friction factor correlations and other flow 




Hexagonal assembly geometry is not a standard heat 
structure model option   
Medium 
6. 
RCCS heat removal from vessel wall is difficult to 




Careful modeling of vessel volumes, in particular the 
elevation values, is required 
Low 
8. 
Matching boundary conditions beyond the vessel wall 
(i.e., containment or environment) will introduce 
additional modeling concerns such as developing a 
detailed and accurate RELAP RCCS model as well as 
capturing non-RCCS heat transfer to the environment 
and other structures  
Low 
*This is estimated, qualitative importance based on the presented RELAP results 
and those shown in the literature using CFD, experiments, or other reliable data 
source for the particular factor or phenomenon 
 
 For the RELAP simulations presented in here, Item 5 in Table 6.1 was mitigated 
by introducing an advanced slab fuel model that better matches the hexagonal geometry 




fuel compacts were modeled. However, 210 fuel compacts is still much smaller than the 
100,000+ fuel compacts that are all modeled using the whole core methods developed in 
this study. Item 3 was directly eliminated in the presented RELAP model by using a 
detailed, realistic, coupled thermal-hydraulic neutronic power distribution.  
 Remaining concerns pertinent to the RELAP model and results presented here and 
most if not all other HTGR RELAP simulations are Items 1, 2, 4 and 6 through 8. Items 1 
and 2 are the most important since the P- and D-LOFC transient results are clearly impacted 
when compared to the results in Chapter 6, which relies on a more robust fuel and whole-
core model. Item 4 can be mitigated by accurately specifying the friction factor correlation 
to use for each hydrodynamic volume if it is determined that the standard RELAP values 
are incorrect. Items 6 through 8 could be critical for overly simplified models but are 
ultimately judged to be of low importance since HTGR vendors will likely devote 
significant resources toward developing a computational model for their specific RCCS 








 A new transient thermal hydraulic method for simulating prismatic HTGRs during 
a loss-of-forced-circulation accident either pressurized (P-LOFC) or depressurized (D-
LOFC) was described in this study. The work presented here extends the steady state 
HTGR thermal hydraulic work published in Huning (2014), Connolly et al. (2016), Huning 
et al. (2016), and others. The principal contributions include: (1) a well-documented 
transient fluid method and implementation, (2) consideration of vessel volumes such as the 
upper plenum, lower plenum, and riser channel, (3) RCCS heat removal from the vessel 
wall, (4) transient heat generation, and (5) the corresponding transient initial and boundary 
conditions for the P- and D-LOFC accident scenarios.  
New HTGR safety methods are needed because exiting methods either cannot 
model the whole core (CFD) or do not model fuel assembly with appropriate fidelity 
(homogenized unit cell and porous media techniques). A commonly used nuclear industry 
safety analysis code, RELAP5-3D, is investigated here for HTGR LOFC analysis. 
However, much like the other LOFC analyses in the literature, significant fuel modeling 
concerns lead to under-predicted fuel temperatures, and overly long transient simulations. 
Many improvements could be made, however, to improve RELAP for simulating LOFC 
accidents.  
The whole core transient thermal hydraulic method developed here addresses two 
key concerns with existing methods: (1) computes whole-core temperature distributions, 
and (2) models the fuel assembly blocks in complete detail with every fuel-pin being 
modeled. This allows for critical key core-level transient phenomena, including heat 
redistribution and bypass flow, to be simulated.  This also allows for detailed fuel assembly 





One other important aspect of the method developed here is the inclusion of a 
detailed, realistic core power distribution determined from a coupled thermal hydraulic and 
neutronics analysis. This power distribution affects the locations of the transient peak fuel 
temperatures. It also affects the initial temperature distribution that governs the heat 
redistribution after reactor SCRAM and ultimately the peak fuel temperatures over the 
transient. 
Other important aspects of the newly developed model include the methods for 
RCCS heat removal estimation and the treatment of transient heat generation. Based on 
RCCS experiment data published in the literature, it is determined that RCCS heat removal 
is primarily a function of vessel wall temperature. This assumption neglects any thermal 
capacitance within the containment gas space and containment structures. For sufficiently 
long transients, this is an appropriate assumption. For heat generation, the supplied initial 
power distribution governs the heat generation in each fuel compact. The total core power 
as a function of time is determined from an ANSI decay heat curve for low-enriched UO2 
fuel. This is also a valid assumption considering that the expected HTGR fuel will be 
composed of low-enriched UO2 fuel.  
It should be noted that this newly developed method is designed to simulate certain 
reactor transients, mainly the LOFC accidents, and predict if or when fuel failure occurs. 
It can also predict steady state temperature and flow distributions if desired. If this 
distribution is not determined at the start of the transient, then it must be supplied by the 
user.  
If fuel temperatures exceed their assumed failure limit of 1600oC, then the transient 
simulation will terminate since the method is not capable of predicting heat transfer effects 
due to fuel geometry changes, or geometry different than a solid cylinder due to fuel failure. 
Although the specific fuel compact dimensions, assembly flat-to-flat diameter, fuel-coolant 
pitch, coolant channel dimensions, assembly, and core heights can be changed, the 




within the present method. Only one type of fuel dimensions and two types of circular 
channels can be assumed. This is due to the similarity and repeated fuel assembly design 
used across several conceptual prismatic HTGRs.  
Likewise, graphite and helium temperatures that exceed 1600oC will terminate the 
LOFC simulations. This is due to expected fuel failure associated with graphite and helium 
temperatures above 1600oC. Should fuel failure temperatures be increased (i.e., due to new 
experimental data or regulatory justification), then material property data for fuel and 
graphite beyond 1600oC should be added to the existing material property data structures 
used in the method. This is not an inherent limit of the method but rather a numerical 
implementation to prevent the simulation from consuming unneeded computational 
resources. One important thing to note, although there is no limit within the newly 
developed method to what core power can be used, is that if any portion of the fuel or 
graphite exceeds 1600oC due to excessive power peaking or too high of core power, the 
simulation will terminate.  
There are no restrictions on the dimensions of the other vessel volumes. There are 
also no inherent restrictions on time-step size, length of the transient, or when to output 
data. All of these parameters are selected by the user to ensure numerical stability in the 
output, no hardware or memory limits are breached, and are physical to the specific HTGR 
design under investigation.   
Considering these restrictions of applicability, using this newly developed method 
transient results including whole-core fuel temperature distributions were computed and 
discussed for the two key design basis accidents for the HTGR, namely the P-LOFC and 
D-LOFC accidents. The reactor design of interest is the MHTGR-350, since it has the most 
openly published design documents and initial LOFC analysis data.  
The LOFC results confirm the preeminent safety design feature of HTGRs, which 
is that in the event of an SBO and a large coolant break, the reactor can safely shutdown to 




is a generational safety improvement over existing LWR designs including Gen 3+ systems 
such as the AP-1000 by Westinghouse, which require operator action or forced circulation 
after ~3 days. For LWRs such the Fukushima BWR Mark-1, this time till operator action 
is required can be as short as 6-8 hours after the initiating event. For the HTGR, a similar 
accident will not require any operator action or active system at any time.  
The improvements associated with the method developed here over conventional 
safety analysis methods are clearly observed when similar RELAP5-3D simulations are 
conducted. Despite the noted fuel modeling improvements (advanced slab model) over 
conventional fuel models (equivalent cylinder models), there are still some irregularities in 
the results, which indicate or highlight the drawbacks of many existing safety analysis 
methods for HTGRs. These irregularities principally include: (1) during the P-LOFC, the 
recirculation flow rate may be too strong leading to an over estimation of RCCS heat 
removal and reduced peak fuel temperature, (2) during the D-LOFC, heat transfer into the 
reflector block regions, in the absence of any significant helium recirculation, is lower than 
expected, and (3) during the D-LOFC, the safe-shutdown phase does not being until very 
late into the transient. All three of these irregularities can be traced back to one of two 
factors, either or both of: (a) inadequate heat transfer estimations into the reflector 
assemblies and between fuel assemblies at the core-level, or (b) pin-power averaging 
leading to lower predicted peak fuel temperatures.  
There are other minor factors associated with using RELAP to simulate LOFC 
accidents; however, these are judged to be of only medium or low importance. It is 
expected that HTGR vendors could rectify these minor factors in preparation for design 
certification. The major factors discussed above, (a) and (b), are unlikely to be remedied 
with current RELAP or similar method capabilities.  
Despite the improvements over RELAP and other methods cited in the literature, 
there are many possible improvements which could be made to the method developed in 




fuel assembly design, it is difficult to quantitatively estimate the magnitude each 
improvement could bring to the overall method. A list of some potential future method 
improvements is shown in Table 7.1.  
Table 7.1 Potential Improvements for the Presented Method 
# Description  Importance* 
1. 
Improve the riser channel heat transfer from the core 
barrel to the vessel wall 
High 
2. 
Develop a containment model that would provide more 
accurate boundary conditions for the D-LOFC accident 
High 
3. 
Add additional vessel volumes (the SCS) to  provide 
more gravitational potential for natural recirculation  
Medium 
4. 
Develop heat transfer models for other regions of the 
vessel like the vessel upper and lower head  
Medium 
5. 
Develop a specific RCCS model similar to those 
described in the literature 
Low 
6. 
Develop capabilities for additional fluids such as air, 
CO2, and N2 for the possibility that the containment 
breaks or is not filled with helium 
Low 
7. 
Include a fuel swelling/fuel performance model to more 
accurately capture the fuel temperature profile  
Low 
* Like Table 6.1, this is estimated, qualitative importance based on the diverse 
information presented in the literature 
  
All of the items except for Item 7 in Table 7.1 should only act to reduce the peak 
temperatures presented in Chapter 5. The first two items could be exceedingly difficult 
without a reference design to use as a template. For the MHTGR-350 and other HTGR 
designs, it is not clear in the literature what the particular riser geometry and containment 
geometry will be. Starting from scratch, it could take several design iterations to optimize 
the containment and riser design. These tasks have similar design tradeoffs common to the 




could be made, if it is too conservative, an unrealistic or a very high peak fuel temperature 
could be predicted during LOFC accident simulations. 
Items 3 and 4 are not expected to be as difficult but it is unlikely that they would 
contribute significantly to vessel heat removal. The dominant heat transfer area between 
the vessel and the RCCS is the vessel wall connected to the riser channel, which is already 
modeled.  
Items 5 and 6 are aspects that would be desirable to have but do not improve the 
accuracy under the current modeling assumptions. Including an RCCS model would allow 
for additional accidents to be considered where the RCCS or containment could be 
impacted. Including non-helium coolant models would allow for additional accidents 
where the containment could be broken. It would also allow for containment designs with 
non-helium environments.   
It should be noted that all of the items except for Item 7 are not related to the fuel 
or core model. Although it is unlikely that fuel performance effects such as swell/shrink 
would appreciably alter the fuel temperature profiles, this is the only significant 
improvement that could be made to the core and fuel model without going to finer unit-cell 
mesh like that of a CFD calculation. Considering this along with the fact that there are still 
several open modeling issues related to the vessel-RCCS heat transfer and fluid volumes, 
it may be advantageous at a later date to couple the fuel and core model to a CFD model 
of the vessel, containment, and RCCS. This would not be too enterprising since the core 
requires significantly more modeling detail than these other volumes and materials. A 
whole-core CFD model is not possible without homogenizing or simplifying the core 
geometry. However, CFD models for the lower plenum, upper plenum, and other regions 
have been demonstrated. One of the best possible outcomes of the work presented in this 
dissertation would be for the core modeling methodology to be adapted into a large 




the complex nature of the prismatic HTGR core, this is the most logical path toward 




APPENDIX A – REACTOR MATERIAL PROPERTIES, FROM 
JOHNSON ET AL. (2009) 
 
Table A.1 Fuel Compact Thermal Conductivity 

















Table A.2 Fuel Compact Fuel Heat Capacity 






















Table A.3 Graphite Thermal Conductivity 













Table A.4 Graphite Heat Capacity 


























Table A.5 Stainless Steel 304 Thermal Conductivity 



















Table A.6 Stainless Steel 304 Heat Capacity 






















APPENDIX B – RELAP POWER DISTRIBUTION  
The power distribution is determined by computing the fraction of core fuel 
modeled within the fuel heat structures. See Section 6.1 for a description of the averaging 
method. The power factors given in Tables B.1 through B.3 add to 100% or 1. They are 
intended to be multiplied by the total core power given at some time after shutdown, during 
the transient. 
Table B.1 Inner Fuel Ring Power Factors 
Axial Node HS 1124 HS 1125 HS 1127 HS 1128 
1 1.3236E-03 2.2061E-03 1.3236E-03 2.9414E-04 
2 1.8365E-03 3.0609E-03 1.8365E-03 4.0812E-04 
3 2.5545E-03 4.2576E-03 2.5546E-03 5.6768E-04 
4 3.8047E-03 6.3412E-03 3.8047E-03 8.4550E-04 
5 6.2638E-03 1.0440E-02 6.2639E-03 1.3920E-03 
6 9.7799E-03 1.6300E-02 9.7801E-03 2.1733E-03 
7 1.2026E-02 2.0044E-02 1.2026E-02 2.6725E-03 
8 1.2075E-02 2.0126E-02 1.2075E-02 2.6834E-03 
9 1.0560E-02 1.7600E-02 1.0560E-02 2.3467E-03 
10 8.7481E-03 1.4580E-02 8.7482E-03 1.9441E-03 
 
Table B.2 Center Fuel Ring Power Factors 
Axial Node HS 1144 HS 1145 HS 1147 HS 1148 
1 1.5090E-03 2.5149E-03 1.5090E-03 3.3533E-04 
2 2.0523E-03 3.4206E-03 2.0524E-03 4.5608E-04 
3 2.8677E-03 4.7796E-03 2.8678E-03 6.3728E-04 
4 4.3316E-03 7.2195E-03 4.3317E-03 9.6260E-04 
5 7.5879E-03 1.2647E-02 7.5880E-03 1.6862E-03 
6 1.3340E-02 2.2234E-02 1.3341E-02 2.9646E-03 
7 1.6952E-02 2.8253E-02 1.6952E-02 3.7671E-03 
8 1.7080E-02 2.8467E-02 1.7080E-02 3.7956E-03 
9 1.4925E-02 2.4876E-02 1.4925E-02 3.3168E-03 








Table B.3 Outer Fuel Ring Power Factors 
Axial Node HS 1174 HS 1175 HS 1177 HS 1178 
1 1.4183E-03 2.3639E-03 1.4183E-03 3.1519E-04 
2 1.9400E-03 3.2333E-03 1.9400E-03 4.3111E-04 
3 2.7095E-03 4.5159E-03 2.7095E-03 6.0212E-04 
4 4.0979E-03 6.8299E-03 4.0980E-03 9.1066E-04 
5 7.3551E-03 1.2259E-02 7.3552E-03 1.6345E-03 
6 1.3795E-02 2.2991E-02 1.3795E-02 3.0655E-03 
7 1.7786E-02 2.9644E-02 1.7786E-02 3.9525E-03 
8 1.7927E-02 2.9878E-02 1.7927E-02 3.9837E-03 
9 1.5653E-02 2.6088E-02 1.5653E-02 3.4784E-03 
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